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APOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
MANNED THERMAL-VACUUM TEST1 NG OF SPACECRAFT 
B y  James C. McLane, Jr. 
Lyndon B . Johnson Space Center 
SUMMARY 
The Apollo Program included a se r i e s  of thermal-vacuum tests  of the command 
and service module and the lunar module in the large chambers A and B of the Space 
Environment Simulation Laboratory at  the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
(formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center). Because these were the first t e s t s  known to  
involve manned operation of large integrated spacecraft in high-f idelity simulated 
thermal-vacuum environments, many special  first-time problems were presented. 
Whenever possible, precedents for  various facets of the operation were drawn from 
procedures used during s imilar  mission checkouts and operations and from analogous 
commercial  practice. In many instances, there was no precedent; methods and pro- 
cedures used in tes t s  at the end of the series were the resul t  of cumulative experience, 
which began with the first test planning in 1963. Changes and improvements resulted 
from almost every new study, operations review, dry run, and test during the next 
6 years .  Tes t  experience and results considered relative to subsequent flight experi- 
ence confirmed that thermal-vacuum testing of integrated manned spacecraft provides 
a feasible, cost-effective, and safe technique with which to obtain maximum confidence 
in spacecraft  flight worthiness ear ly  in the program. 
I NTRODUCTI ON 
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, major efforts were expended by industry, 
the Department of Defense, and the National Advisory Committee for  Aeronautics (and 
its successor ,  the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)) toward the 
definition of a new combined-environments testing discipline to support development 
and checkout of spacecraft. Originally called space environment simulation testing, 
this area of pr imary supporting activity subsequently came to be known as thermal- 
vacuum testing because of the predominance of the thermal  and vacuum environments 
in most tests. A large number of Government and industry facilities fo r  thermal- 
vacuum testing were designed and constructed during this period. These facilities 
were used for tests of materials;  components; subsystems; and complete, small ,  
unmanned spacecraft .  However, time and effort were necessary to  develop the very 
large,  high-quality simulation facil i t ies that were needed to accommodate full-size 
manned spacecraft;  fo r  this reason, facilities were not available for  complete environ- 
mental tests on the two American manned space programs, Project Mercury and the 
Gemini Program. Some manned environ- 
mental ground tes t s  of these spacecraft 
were accomplished; however, the tests in- 
volved considerable compromises in simu- 
lation fidelity, and it was not possible to  
exercise many of the flight systems in a 
true simulated thermal-vacuum environ- 
ment. Design of two large man-rated 
chambers at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson 
Space Center (JSC) (formerly the Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC)) Space Environ- 
ment Simulation Laboratory (SESL) (fig. 1) 
was begun in 1962. Construction was com- 
pleted in 1965. These chambers made it 
possible to include high-fidelity environ- 
Figure 1. - Space environment 
simulation laboratory. 
mental tests for  the first time-on large spacecraft with manned occupancy. In this re- 
port, some of the more important technical engineering problems that were unique to  
thermal-vacuum testing, and management innovations that were developed and used to 
ca r ry  out this specialized activity will be emphasized. 
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the staff of the MSC Space 
Environment Test Division in providing technical and historical information that is in- 
cluded in this report. The special efforts of P. B. Campbell and A. B. McIntyre of 
the Test Management Office are particularly appreciated. 
TEST-PHI LOSOPHY DEVELOPMENT 
The development of a general philosophy for  conducting manned o r  unmanned in- 
tegrated spacecraft thermal-vacuum tes t s  presented an ear ly  issue, with major differ- 
ences in opinion. In considering the principal elements of this philosophy, a number of 
alternative approaches were proposed. In each case, the approach adopted represented 
a realistic compromise that could result  in maximum benefit to  the program. Some of 
the most important elements of the test philosophy are discussed in the following sec- 
tions of this report. 
Purposes of t h e  Tests 
Originally, it was presumed that there would be no major design issues  to be re- 
solved in the integrated thermal-vacuum tests. This premise was based on plans fo r  
very extensive testing at the subsystem and lower levels before integrated thermal- 
vacuum testing, and the integrated tests were viewed primarily as a final man-rating 
and flight-worthiness demonstration of the spacecraft before committing it to manned 
flight. However, as the program progressed, it became evident that there were many 
areas of uncertainty regarding specific performance of subsystems, which could only 
be determined in flight o r  in integrated systems thermal-vacuum ground tests. Many 
of these uncertainties were related to off-nominal or  emergency operating modes of 
spacecraft systems, and the thermal-vacuum tests presented a number of practical 
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advantages over flight tests for  such performance investigation. Among the advantages 
were lower cost ,  expanded instrumentation, better safety, accessibility of hardware 
for  post-test (postflight) inspection and analysis, and the ability to repeat a test (flight) 
quickly and economically to obtain a missed objective o r  to confirm correction of an 
anomalous condition. Therefore, it was decided that, in addition to the demonstration 
of spacecraft capability to perform nominal missions, a number of off-nominal opera- 
tions would be included that would benefit flight planning, especially in areas of contin- 
gent operations. 
It was also recognized that the design margin in some spacecraft elements was 
such that the subtle influence of final production o r  manufacturing techniques and inte- 
gration with other spacecraft elements could result in out-of -l imits performance not 
identified previously in nonintegrated subsystems tests. An example of this circum - 
stance was the lunar module (LM) passive thermal control system, in which the effi- 
ciency of the extensive multilayer reflective insulation was a function of vacuum level 
within the insulation layups. This interlayer vacuum was dependent on the integrated 
venting scheme, the influence of outgassing and leaks from components within the LM 
structure,  and the details  of workmanship in manufacturing and installing the insulation. 
The combined influence of these factors  could be determined only by means of integrated 
systems thermal-vacuum tes t s  (or  development flights); therefore, the tes t  data were 
considerably more significant than a simple demonstration of final flight readiness.  
A basic requirement for  design and operation of almost every spacecraft system 
was a detailed knowledge of heat flow and temperatures within the spacecraft. Analyt- 
ical  thermal  models of the integrated spacecraft were developed for  this purpose, and 
these models received approximate experimental verification from thermal-vacuum 
te s t s  of mockups of representative areas of the spacecraft  and ear ly  full-scale mockups 
of the entire spacecraft. These relatively simple tes t s  were conducted in smaller ,  less 
complex commercial  facilities ear ly  in the program. A s  in all mathematical analyses, 
the thermal models were limited by the input data on the thermal properties of materials,  
configurations, and so forth, and many simplifying assumptions had to be made. The 
high-fidelity thermal-vacuum test data were used to verify o r  correct  these assumptions 
and to provide data relating to detail excluded in the network. Thus, flight configura- 
tion verification and fine tuning of the spacecraft thermal  models were recognized as 
pr imary  test objectives in the final thermal-vacuum tests .  
In considering the inherent nature of an integrated thermal-vacuum test operation 
that has as pr imary objectives the verification of systems performance and thermal  
models, it became obvious that additional benefits could be derived at little o r  no addi- 
tional cost  simply by the identification of secondary objectives and the introduction of 
procedures and reporting techniques to ensure attention to these objectives. Thus, it 
was decided that ground-based spacecraft-checkout procedures which were developed 
for preflight spacecraft checkout at the launch site would be used wherever possible in 
s imilar  test-preparation activities. Because in most cases the test preceded s imilar  
operations at the launch site, a valuable early procedure checkout was provided under 
a somewhat less time -cri t ical  situation than would be presented subsequently at the 
launch site. Also, any initial checkout-procedure deficiency that resulted in damage 
to  the spacecraft  could be accommodated with less program impact by the tes t  space- 
craf t  than by a flight spacecraft .  Similar rationale was used in adopting, wherever 
possible, crew operating procedures for  use by the onboard test crewmen. The major 
difference between flight and ground tes t  was that, in flight, most of the procedural 
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steps were performed individually by the astronaut without detailed, documented con- 
firmation; in the tes ts ,  most s teps  were performed on command from the tes t  director  
and, when executed, were confirmed by the crewman so that a precise  record of actions 
and configuration w a s  obtained that could be correlated closely with the test data. 
The tes t  provided opportunities for  a realist ic evaluation of many crew-support 
i tems in a flight-like environment. Because test t imes would approximate the length 
of actual missions and would require full real-t ime dependency on these i tems by the 
crewmen, subjective evaluation was added as a secondary objective. 
The early tes t s  of the series confirmed that there  would be completely unexpected 
flight-significant occurrences during test operations. These occurrences had not been 
recognized specifically in the tes t  objectives. Therefore,  it  was essential  that proce- 
dures  be adopted to ensure that such occurrences were recognized, identified, docu- 
mented, and investigated, and that proper action was taken, whether the occurrences 
related directly to a formal test objective o r  not. In practice, this  philosophy w a s  not 
implemented as rigorously as it might have been, and several  flight-significant anoma- 
lies were not identified and investigated promptly and thoroughly when f i r s t  manifested 
during the test .  These significant anomalies will be discussed elsewhere in this report .  
Selection of Spacecraft To Be Tested 
In keeping with the original plan that the thermal-vacuum testing would be pr i -  
marily a final man-rating and flight-worthiness demonstration, ear ly  proposals were 
made to subject each flight spacecraft to a thermal-vacuum test  before delivery to the 
launch site. Because these proposals were impractical, a compromise was devised. 
It was decided that less elaborate facilities would be constructed at the launch site, 
enabling checkout of flight spacecraft under modest vacuum conditions a t  ambient tem- 
perature as a part  of normal launch preparation. These tes t s  were adequate to  confirm 
operational status of all essential  systems but did not involve the full thermal-vacuum 
environment, which might degrade thermal coatings and life -limited components to the 
point at which refurbishment would be necessary before launch. Moreover, these rela- 
tively simple tests could be performed at the launch site at considerably less cost and 
schedule impact than would have been required in a thermal-vacuum chamber at MSC. 
Three alternatives were presented concerning the choice of spacecraft to undergo 
full thermal-vacuum testing. F i r s t ,  production spacecraft, which would be refurbished 
after testing and flown on a late Apollo mission, could be used. Because the tes t  data 
were required as ear ly  as possible and always before the f i r s t  manned flight, the space- 
c raf t  would have to be one of the first in the production run, and a very selective ear ly  
cut-off date for  design and manufacturing changes would be required to ensure timely 
delivery. Moreover, some deviations from flight configuration would be required s o  
that the spacecraft could be adapted to perform special simulations (such as rocket 
f ir ings) and to accept the special tes t  instrumentation. These factors  would result  in 
the tes t  spacecraft being considerably out of configuration for  downstream flight mis- 
sions. This situation, together with the necessary replacement of life-limited equip- 
ment, escalated the cost  of refurbishment to such an extent that the use of the test 
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spacecraft for  a subsequent flight mission was uneconomical. A second alternative was 
the fabrication of a simplified test spacecraft with thermal simulators for much of the 
expensive, long-lead-time equipment. This approach was not considered seriously be - 
cause of the obvious potential for  inaccurate test results when even subtle differences 
f rom flight configuration exist. Also, this approach would effectively negate the phi- 
losophy of qualifying flight spacecraft by similarity to the test spacecraft. For  a third 
alternative, certain production spacecraft could be dedicated to the thermal-vacuum 
test program. This approach was adopted, and it had many advantages. First, late 
design and production changes to the spacecraft could be evaluated individually and fore- 
gone where the change would not clearly influence the forthcoming test. Ear ly  delivery 
of the spacecraft could be ensured further by selectively permitting the use of prototype 
o r  non-f light-qualified hardware when cost and expediency dictated and when evaluation 
showed that the component was not cri t ical  to the test. The increased safety of the 
ground test compared with the flight test made this substitution feasible in many in- 
stances. An additional attractive feature of this approach was that the use of test-  
dedicated spacecraft left the test program essentially open ended to account for  
contingencies; that is, contingency retests could be added to the program without a 
cut-off date forced by refurbishment-schedule requirements, as would be necessary 
i f  the spacecraft were to be used on a later 
flight. To make this approach more cost 
effective, the test spacecraft were also 
used for many secondary non-thermal- 
vacuum tests (cabin-noise studies, radio- 
logical shielding surveys, biological 
sterilization demonstrations, and many 
others). Three spacecraft were dedicated 
to the program (fig. 2). Spacecraft 
(SC) 008 was the first man-rated Block I 
command and service module (CSM) to be 
produced and was the first Apollo space- 
craf t  tested. Spacecraft 2TV-1 was the 
first production Apollo Block I1 CSM. 
Spacecraft LTA-8 was the first production 
man-rated lunar module, although it was 
preceded by two lunar modules that were 
designated for  unmanned development 
flights and were not equipped with all flight 
systems. Tes ts  of these three spacecraft 
comprised the program, with major manu- 
facturing effort, to  update Earth-orbital 
configuration to lunar-mission configura- 
tion, being performed onsite at MSC on 
spacecraft 2TV-1 and' LTA-8 between the 
initial and final tests. (a) Spacecraft 008. 
Figure 2. - Thermal-vacuum test 
spacecraft. 
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(b) Spacecraft 2TV-1. 
Figure 2. - Concluded. 
(c) Spacecraft LTA-8. 
Facility Capability and Limitations 
Facility design was essentially complete and construction well underway before 
the final decision to perform thermal-vacuum tes t s  of Apollo spacecraft at MSC. Al- 
though the original design provided general capability fo r  tests of this sort ,  the facility 
was by no means designed uniquely for  specified Apollo test requirements because, ob- 
viously, the requirements were not known when design was undertaken. 
Chamber A (fig. 3), the largest  of the two thermal-vacuum chambers, was in- 
tended to be used for tests of large manned spacecraft and clusters  of spacecraft (such 
as the.mated CSM/LM). The chamber has  external dimensions of 65 feet in diameter 
by 120 feet i n  height, and a nominal upright test volume of approximately 25 feet in  
diameter and 75 feet i n  height was provided for spacecraft that weighed as much as 
150 000 pounds (fig. 4). For  tests requiring high-quality solar  simulation, this test 
volume was limited to  20 feet in diameter by 65 feet in height, because penetration 
ports were not available for  the modular system of carbon-arc-source solar-simulator 
6 
Figure 3. - Chamber A. 
Capability and description 
units. In fact, solar-simulator modules 
sufficient to irradiate the full test volume 
were never manufactured; procurement was 
limited to the number actually required for  
the Apollo tests that were finally derived. 
Solar-simulator modules were in fixed loca- 
tions on top of the chamber (projected down 
vertically) and on the side of the chamber 
(projected horizontally). Directional cycling 
of the side Sun was achieved by rotating the 
floor of the chamber, to which the space- 
craft  mounting fixture was attached, at what- 
ever rate was desired during the test .  The 
heat sink of space was simulated by cooling 
almost all internal chamber surfaces to ap- 
proximately 90" K by the use of circulating 
liquid nitrogen (LN ). Coincidentally, the 
heat sink also functioned as a vacuum cryo- 
pump, providing an almost unlimited pump- 
ing capacity for  water vapor and other gases  
that were condensable at its temperature.. 
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Outside di men sions 
25 ft diameter x 75 ft hig 
Figure 4. - General features of chamber A. 
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Other gases, including oxygen and nitrogen and excluding only helium, hydrogen, and 
neon, were pumped at the rate  of 15 torr-l i ters/sec by cryocondensing surfaces a r -  
ranged around the chamber walls and maintained at 17" K. The three noncondensable 
gases were pumped at the rate of approximately 0.4 torr-l i ter/sec by 18 large oil- 
diffusion pumps. Atmospheric inleakage from the more than 300 vacuum feedthroughs 
usually required about half of the available pumping capacity, leaving the other half to 
account for the gas load generated by leakage and outgassing from the spacecraft under 
test. A chamber pressure of 1 X 10 to r r  was  attainable with these gas loads present. 
A double manlock, one for maintaining inside safety and rescue observers at interme- 
diate rescue pressures  and the other to permit hard-vacuum ingress and egress  by test  
crewmen, was located at the ground level of the chamber. A single manlock for  inside 
observers was located 31 feet above floor level. An emergency repressurization sys-  
tem was provided that could bring the chamber to a rescue working level of 6 psia in 
30 seconds with a mixture of dry  oxygen and nitrogen. Repressurization from that 
level to full  atmospheric pressure was  accomplished originally with unconditioned at- 
mospheric air; however, after the initial t es t s  of the CSM, the system was modified to 
permit fu l l  repressurization in 90 seconds by the use of a dry  oxygen-nitrogen mixture 
to avoid the heavy chamber fogging that would occur if small  amounts of atmospheric 
water vapor were present when the cryogenic heat-sink shroud was still cold. 
-6 
Chamber B (fig. 5) was provided to perform tes t s  on smaller spacecraft such as 
the Apollo command module (CM), on space suits and other extravehicular activity (EVA) 
equipment, and on subsystems and 
intermediate-size equipment. Chamber B 
systems were similar to those of the larger  
chamber A but generally reduced in size. 
The 35-foot-diameter by 43-foot-high ex- 
ternal chamber dimensions resulted in a 
useful test volume of approximately 13 feet 
in diameter by 27 feet in height for  space- 
craf t  that weighed as much as 75 000 pounds 
(fig. 6). Fixed penetrations for  a 20-foot- 
diameter top Sun were provided, but the 
actual initial installation of solar modules 
provided an irradiated area only 5.6 feet 
in diameter. Because there was no side 
solar  simulator, rotation of the floor was 
not provided. Chamber B was also 
equipped to present only 90" K heat-sink 
surfaces to the tes t  volume. Originally, 
the design vacuum level was 1 x 10 
and this level was attained by the use of a 
system of oil-diffusion pumps. Before 
Apollo testing w a s  undertaken, a 17" K 
cryopumping system was added, providing 
a final pumping capacity of 1 2  torr-  
liters/sec for  condensable gases  and 
0.25 torr-liter/sec for the noncondensable 
gases at a chamber pressure of 
-4 torr ,  
Figure 5. - Chamber B. 
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Capability and description 
0 u t  side di mension s 35 ft diameter x 43 ft high 
I nside clear dimensions- 25 ft diameter x 30 ft high 
Maximum vehicle size- 13 ft diameter x 27 f t  high 
Maximum vehicle weight - 75 OOO Ib 
Pressure level 1 x 10-4 torr 
(70-mile altitude)' 
Lunar p l a n e r 1  Stationary 
Tnmnnratiiro intnrinr 
Solar simulation s o u r c e d  Carbon arc units > I
'Upgraded before L M  tests to 1 x loe6 torr 
Figure 6. - General features of chamber B. 
1 X 
leakage was limited to approximately 3 torr-liters/sec, leaving approximately the same 
capability for  spacecraft gas  load as was available in chamber A. The emergency re- 
pressurization systems in chambers A and B had essentially identical performance. 
t o r r .  Because of fewer vacuum penetrations in chamber B, atmospheric in- 
The original facility design did not include the basic capability to meet several  
specific Apollo test requirements that were identified subsequently. These deficiencies 
were a major influence in deriving concepts for test configuration, and decisions had to 
be made to accept them as restraints o r  to  modify the facility to upgrade performance. 
Three deficiencies that required major consideration were (1) no basic capability to 
handle significant amounts of hazardous spacecraft fluids (such as hydrogen and cryo- 
genic oxygen), (2) no universal capability to simulate albedo and planetary thermal 
emissions, and (3) no universal capability to simulate oblique solar angles. The spe- 
cial problems posed by these deficiencies and the approach adopted in each case will be 
discussed elsewhere in this report. A fourth deficiency was that the original design 
provided no universal system for  acquiring and processing data from the spacecraft 
under test. The facility itself had been designed f o r  manual operation, and the data 
necessary for  its operation were displayed by means of conventional instruments. 
Where necessary, facility measurements were recorded on s t r ip  charts; no complex 
computer operations were involved. Apollo Program management provided an ideal 
solution to this problem by designating two acceptance checkout equipment (ACE) com- 
puter systems for  installation in the laboratory. These special-purpose computer sys- 
t ems  were designed specifically to provide up-link and down-link command and 
data-acquisition capability for Apollo spacecraft checkout at the manufacturing plants 
and at the launch site. With the addition of a relatively small  amount of peripheral 
equipment, the computer systems were ideally suited to performing the same functions 
in pretest  buildup of the spacecraft and ground support equipment (GSE) at the 
9 
thermal-vacuum facility and were also used for  up-link command and down-link data- 
acquisition functions during the test (fig. 7). Data-acquisition capability included real- 
time processing of some 500 of the approximately 2000 total test-art icle measurements 
to assist the test  team during performance of the test .  A few essential  facility meas- 
urements also were handled by the system. During thermal-vacuum tests, one ACE 
station was designated as prime, and the other station was maintained in backup status 
in order  to assume all control and data-acquisition functions within 5 minutes of a fail- 
ure of the prime station, thus avoiding tes t  abort. By maintaining these computer sys-  
tems  in common configuration with those a t  other Apollo si tes,  the maximum experience 
benefit was obtained by similari ty to the other operations. 
* * - -_  , , \ 
/ \ I \ 
. _- -- 
/ /  ChamberA '\ Chamber B \\ 
\ \ 
Command Analog commands I Test I 
/ 
/ 
I 
I GSE art icle 
\ 
\ / 
I 
I 
I A A \ 
\ / \ / 
\ / Digital Digital \ / / 
\ / . , '- _ _  - 0  commands commands - Analog m e a s u r e m e k  Analog measurements 
Analog I Digitized Digitized + Analog 
Chamber A measurements Signal measurements measurements measurements Chamber B Signal 
c conditioning condit ioning 4 
equipment equipment 
Switching 
equipment 
A A 
Computer 
I I facility systems facility systems 
- _ - - - - .  - - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - 
I I ACE I I Chamber B I 
Control I 
I I 
1 , - - - - - - - - - - _ - - 
I I I I control room 
T I 
I 
I Chamber A 
I 
I 
I I 
I Control 
I I 
conwles 
J 
I 
I 
I I rooms T I I 
I I I Computing Computing I I 
I I 
L--  _ _ _  _ 1 L - - -  _ _ - _  
control r m m  
consoles 
A 
Digital information Digital information 
Figure 7. - Block schematic of SESL ACE systems.  
Apollo-common GSE was, as a matter of policy, used to the maximum at the 
SESL in support of the tests. This feature provided an advantage in operational shake- 
down of the equipment and associated procedures. However, in practice, i t  was seen 
that the peculiarities of the tes t  and of the test site resulted in much of the equipment 
not being ideally useful. In some cases ,  it was necessary to modify the equipment o r  
even to substitute alternate equipment to accomplish the necessary functions. Consid- 
erable effort was expended in continuous updating of this equipment to maintain it in 
Apollo-common configuration, even in instances where the modification was of no con- 
sequence in its use for  the thermal-vacuum test program. It was also observed that, 
for  the thermal-vacuum test ,  special  GSE (usually simpler and less expensive) could 
have performed much better in this  application than did some of the Apollo-common 
equipment. 
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Test Configuration and Time Lines 
Block I command and service module tests. - Factors that influenced the develop- 
ment of a specific test configuration included test objectives, facility capability, space- 
craf t  design mission, and characterist ics of spacecraft systems. Initial attention was 
focused on configuring the tests of the Block I CSM (SC 008). These tests, which were 
planned to precede all others by at least 12 months, were particularly critical because, 
in addition to  the objectives relating to spacecraft performance, the tests would also 
serve to  verify the overall concepts derived for conducting integrated systems manned 
testing in the new facility. Chamber A was selected for  the test. The location of the 
top and side Suns in the chamber, and the desire  to provide directional cycling of the 
Sun as the vehicle rotated on its longitudinal axis, dictated that the spacecraft be placed 
near  the center of the test volume, with its longitudinal axis alined vertically (fig. 8). 
The exact height of the vehicle was determined by alining the CM side hatch approxi- 
mately opposite the chamber manlock, which w a s  located at the 31-foot elevation. A 
walkway, extending from this  manlock and encircling the CM, provided the crewmen 
and rescue observers  with access  to  the side hatch at all rotational positions of the 
spacecraft. The walkway was split along its centerline, and the two sections could be 
folded back against the chamber wal l  when not in use (fig. 9). This  vertical  orientation 
of the spacecraft also was optimum in accommodating the crew for  extended one-g stay 
t imes in the spacecraft. Another concession to gravity and crew mobility was made by 
removing the center couch from the CM and providing non-flight-configuration floor 
pads and couch pads for  crew comfort. 
In the construction of a test time line (that is, the selection of operational and 
environmental sequences to be used for  the test), two general alternatives were avail- 
able. The first method, referred to  as mis-  
sion simulation, consisted of duplicating in  
real t ime, insofar as possible, the exact 
sequence of events planned for  the space- 
craft design mission. The second method, 
called block simulation, involved designing 
a number of interchangeable test sequences 
o r  modes, each aimed at specific perform- 
ance demonstrations under environments 
selected to s t r e s s  the systems of interest  
to  the ex t remes  required for  full evaluation. 
Of the two methods, block simulation of- 
fe r red  distinct advantages if the character-  
is t ics  of the spacecraft thermal  control 
systems met  the following two cr i ter ia :  
(1) spacecraft  temperatures had to stabilize 
within a reasonably short  time after estab- 
lishment of a new operating mode or exter- 
nal environment and (2) after any operating 
mode, suitable initial temperature condi- 
t ions had t o  be reestablished within a rea-  
sonable t ime to  permit initiation of a new 
mode. The CSM was  designed with many 
active thermal  control systems that re- 
sponded quickly to  changing operating 
Figure 8. - Orientation of CSM in 
chamber A. 
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(a) View from manlock (ramp closed). (b) View from above (ramp open). 
Figure 9. - Ingress-egress ramp, chamber A. 
conditions. Moreover, in those CSM a reas  in which passive thermal control was used, 
only a few hours were needed to reach stable conditions in any changed environment. 
Thus, the CSM was ideally adapted to  a block simulation time line (fig. lo) ,  which 
offered maximum opportunity for investigating off -nominal operations and for  exploring 
performance limits of various systems. An additional advantage w a s  that, if difficul- 
ties arose during a particular test sequence because of malfunction of a spacecraft or  
facility system, the test could be diverted quickly to one of the other modes not r e -  
quiring the system while repa i rs  o r  workarounds were performed. Even with the block- 
time-line concept, it was still desirable to run the test for  a total time that was 
approximately equal to the fu l l  length of the spacecraft design mission in order  to ob- 
tain data related to  consumables usage, life-limited equipment, and habitability. 
The importance of albedo and planetary-emission thermal radiations was not over- 
looked in the SC 008 tests. Early planning included a considerable engineering effort to 
investigate concepts for adding these environments to the existing heat sink and solar  
simulations. A small  albedo simulator, which was based on the principles and design 
features  derived from this study, was constructed and subsequently used in several  
manned tes ts  of space suits. A major practical problem in adapting this design con- 
cept t o  the spacecraft was that there  appeared to be no easy way to  integrate the design 
with the CM personnel-access platform; the platform was mandatory for  safety reasons. 
In addition, the estimate of construction cost was prohibitive. Fortunately, by the use 
of the block-time-line concept, it was possible to  alter solar-irradiance periods to pro- 
vide partial compensation for this deficiency; the remaining correction was made in the 
analytical thermal model. 
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(108 h r  total) 
Planned time l ine 
(120 h r  totall 
As-run time line 
A .  Bay 4 hot soak, side Sun 
B. Bay 6 hot soak, side Sun 
C. Bay 3 hot soak, side Sun 
D. Open hatch, side Sun 
E. Translunar coast. side Sun.  1 rotation per hour 
F. RCS quad D hot soak, side Sun 
G.  Cold soak, no Sun, 1 rotation per hour 
H. CM hot soak, top Sun 
I .  Chamber warmup and repressurization 
P. Special overboard water dump test 
Figure 10. - Typical block simulation time line for  CSM testing. 
Real-time ascent-pressure -change simulation was beyond the capability of the 
facility. It required approximately 3 hours to bring the chamber pressure  from atmos- 
pheric pressure  to 1 to r r ,  the range of greatest interest  as far as rate effects were con- 
cerned. Even though this rate of change did not correspond to the flight value where 
transition to  vacuum is accomplished in only a few minutes, valuable data  relating to 
the ability of many systems to adapt to vacuum were still obtained during the pumpdown 
phase (fig. 11). Approximately 16 additional hours were needed to complete chamber 
heat-sink cooldown and to reach the ultimate operating vacuum level. No attempt was 
made to simulate ascent aerodynamic heating o r  booster -induced vibration; so the CM 
boost protective cover and the launch escape rocket, which are jettisoned in flight dur-  
ing the launch phase, were not included in the tes t  configuration. 
The effects of thermal  soakback from 
firings of the service propulsion system 
(SPS) and reaction control system (RCS) 
rockets were not considered to be signifi- 
cant to  the extent that special provisions 
for  simulations should be included, as 
would be done later in tests of the LM. 
However, when the fuel and oxidizer were 
used, simulations were devised for  the 
changes in thermal  m a s s  of the main pro- 
pulsion tanks. The tanks were loaded with 
a dummy propellant, water/glycol, which 
was  dumped to other tanks outside the vac- 
uum chamber when propellant usage was to  
be simulated. 
Roughing 
Diffusion-pump valves modulate open 
Roughing stops 
Diffusion-pump valve full open 
Begin LN2 shroud cool-down 
Begin cooling helium cryopanels 
Design ultimate 
pressure, 
I I I 
4 8 12 16 20 
l ime, h r  
0 
10-6, 
Figure 11. - Chamber A pumpdown 
curve. 
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Hydrogen and oxygen, required fo r  fuel  cells, and oxygen, required for  the envi- 
ronmental control system (ECS), posed a more difficult problem. It was considered 
essential  that the fuel cel ls  and the ECS function in flight configuration during the tests. 
However, a leaking oxygen o r  hydrogen system could pose a much more severe  fire and 
explosion hazard in the chamber than on the launch pad o r  in flight because of the con- 
tainment characterist ics of the chamber. Studies were conducted to determine the safe 
quantity limits of these gases within the chamber; the findings were that, if the full 
flight load were t o  leak into the chamber, an explosive safety hazard of unacceptable 
magnitude would exist. However, quantities in the chamber could be limited to  accept- 
able values by locating the supply of these gases  outside and piping them in directly to 
the spacecraft distribution systems rather  than filling the flight tanks with cryogenic 
fluids. Quick-acting valves outside the chamber were provided to isolate the gaseous 
supplies in case a significant in-chamber leak occurred. Hydrogen detectors were 
located in the facility roughing-pump train and in the diffusion-pump backing system. 
If concentrations of hydrogen exceeded l imits in these systems, nitrogen ballast gas  
could be introduced into the pumping t ra ins  to  avoid an explosive mixture of hydrogen 
and oxygen o r  air. 
A functional demonstration of the spacecraft waste water dump system under var -  
ious flight conditions was identified as a mandatory test requirement. This spacecraft  
system was designed to vent urine and excess  fuel-cell-generated water to space through 
a heated orifice on the side of the CM. During tes t s  of the Block I spacecraft, simu- 
lated dumps were conducted in f u l l  flight configuration using both fuel-cell water and 
urine; however, concern about undesirable corrosion of chamber elements (principally 
the very expensive collimating m i r r o r s  of the solar  simulators) on exposure to urine 
salts resulted in the dumps, during Block II tests, being limited to fuel-cell water.  In 
these later tes ts ,  urine w a s  removed from the spacecraft through a special pipe con- 
nected to an evacuated tank outside the chamber. 
Lunar module tests.  - Configuring the tes t s  of the LM posed many new problems 
that did not exist when CSM tes t s  were considered. Firs t ,  the spacecraft had few ac- 
tive thermal control systems. Great dependence was placed on a rather  complex sys- 
tem of passive thermal control that involved extensive vacuum-dependent multilayer 
reflective insulation and approximately 32 different thermal  coatings to control radiant 
heat exchange at various locations on the surface of the spacecraft. Because of the 
spacecraft design, it was not possible to reach complete thermal equilibrium during 
the mission. In a general sense, the spacecraft underwent a slow cooling process  f rom 
the t ime of launch until mission completion. Of course,  there  were many exceptions 
to this  generalization if specific systems and components are considered. The sequence 
and duration of operational events such as engine firings, cabin pressurizations,  and 
so forth, had a profound influence on temperatures,  as did the timing of the great  vari-  
ety of natural thermal environments that were encountered in the design mission. The 
effects of these factors  were cumulative, making it difficult to establish initial test con- 
ditions at will that would correspond to intermediate t imes in the mission. These fac- 
t o r s  dictated a mission-simulation-type test t ime line ra ther  than the block simulation 
that was used with the CSM. Even with a mission-simulation t ime line, operational op- 
tions existed within the spacecraft design mission that could hasten o r  re tard the general  
spacecraft cooldown. Therefore, two separate test t ime lines were devised (fig. 12);  
the first, in which options were  combined that would result ,  generally, in the warmest 
conditions at the end of the mission, was called the "hot-case test"; the second, in which 
options were combined to resul t  in coldest conditions at the end of the mission, was  
called the "cold-case test. If 
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Phase 
Duration, hr  101 312 
Manning 
Cold-case test Turnaround 
A B C D  E 
F 
64 
A.  Translunar coast 
B .  Lunar orbits and crew ingress and descent 
C. Lunar touchdown and crew exits LM 
D.  Crew ingress, lunar lift-off, crew exits LM 
E. Turnaround activities to configure for hot-case lunar stay 
F. Translunar coast 
G .  Lunar orbits and crew ingress and descent 
H. Lunar touchdown, crew egress and slay time for thermal stabilization 
I. Turnaround for subsolar lunar stay, crew ingress 
J .  Subsolar lunar stay and crew egress 
K .  Turnaround for thermal mission simulation 
L. Crew ingress and thermal mission simulation 
G H  I J K L 
5 9  39 45 36 11 
B l Z Q  Rsq 11 
Figure 12. - Typical mission-simulation time line. 
The design of a tes t  configuration that would provide accurate thermal  simulations 
for  the different mission environments seemed at first to  be an insurmountable problem 
because of facility limitations. Conditions to  be simulated included (1) translunar flight 
in docked mode with the CSM, (2) lunar orbit in docked mode with the CSM, (3) lunar 
orbit  in the undocked configuration, (4) descent to  the lunar surface, (5) lunar-surface 
stay, and, finally, (6) solo ascent-stage operation from the lunar surface to lunar orbit  
and in lunar orbit. The combinations of solar angles and lunar-albedo and planetary- 
radiation view angles and intensities that had to be simulated were practically unlimited. 
An additional complexity was that, in the ground test, it would be necessary to 
maintain the LM in an upright position to make manned operations in the unit-gravity 
field of the Ear th  feasible. Because docking of the LM and CSM resu l t s  in the respec-  
tive f loors  of the two spacecraft being located in opposing directions, concurrent manned 
testing in the docked configuration was not feasible. Therefore,  the LM and CSM were 
tested separately, and the radiative and conductive heat paths at  the interface were 
simulated. 
A new approach to  simulating thermal  inputs was required because of the fixed 
orientation of the facility solar simulator, the restrictions against tilting the spacecraft  
to oblique solar  angles, and the lack of albedo-simulator design concepts that would 
satisfy the diversity of mission conditions. This requirement was met by the design of 
a special  conformal-skin-heater system. The concept necessitated that the thermal- 
absorptance character is t ics  of the external spacecraft surfaces  be known from previous 
tests of the thermal  coatings. Considering the vehicle location and orientation in var -  
ious pa r t s  of the mission, the thermal energy absorption by each spacecraft  surface at 
any time could be calculated. During testing, this  energy was imposed directly on the 
exposed surfaces  of the spacecraft by means of e lectr ic  hea te rs  that were bonded t o  the 
inside of these surfaces .  The spacecraft was then free to assume natural  thermal bal- 
ance by its own internal thermal mechanisms and by radiation to  the cold chamber walls. 
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Implementation of the conformal-skin-heater concept involved dividing the external 
spacecraft surfaces into approximately 300 separately controllable zones. The complex- 
ity of continuously controlling the amount of heat to these zones for long test t imes im- 
mediately led to considering automation of the system. However, automation was 
considered to be too expensive, and the system was operated manually by approximately 
23 technicians who manipulated control potentiometers according to preplanned operating 
procedures (fig. 13). Real-time modification of the procedures was needed for special 
conditions; this modification was directed by a team of thermal analysts who were moni- 
toring test data. 
In addition to the skin heaters  that 
were used for  simulation of solar and 
albedo energy, several  special-purpose 
"guard" heaters were installed at GSE con- 
nections to the spacecraft. These heaters 
provided a neutral thermal interface at 
points where nonflight equipment (cables, 
gas - sample lines, propellant -de tanking 
piping, and so forth) penetrated the 
spacecraft. 
Thermal soakback from the rocket 
engines and nozzle extensions of the RCS, 
ascent propulsion system, and descent pro- 
pulsion system were important factors in 
the LM thermal model. Because of this 
fact, rocket firings were simulated ther- 
mally by electric heater elements that were 
installed on the engines and rocket nozzles. 
These heaters were activated at the appro- 
priate times in the mission to simulate con- 
ditions during and after engine burns. For  
the descent -engine -burn and ascent -engine - 
burn simulations, the soakback lasted 5 to 
10  hours after a 10- to 15-minute engine 
burn, and the heaters were operated at 
temperatures as great as 700" F. The 
descent-engine-base heat shield was simi- 
larlv heated to as much as 950" F to simu- 
a 
Figure 13. - Section of the LM skin 
heater control consoles. 
late conditions associated with descent-engine firings. Typical simulations of reaction 
control system injector soakbacks involved the heaters operating for  15 to 30 minutes 
at temperatures as great as 300" F (fig. 14). As in the tests of the CSM, the main 
propulsion tanks were loaded with dummy propellant (in this case Freon TF)  and were 
offloaded to tanks outside the chamber during the tests to  simulate changes in thermal 
mass  during engine firings. Changes inthe thermal mass  of the RCS tankage were not 
very significant; the tanks were loaded with dummy propellant f o r  the duration of the 
mission. 
The mission-simulation-type time line for LM testing required that solo-ascent- 
stage phases of the mission be simulated immediately after the lunar-stay-time phases 
that involved the mated ascent-descent stages. To avoid the complexities of removing 
tne LM descent stage from the chamber f o r  these operations, a thermal-conditioning 
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Figure 14. - Electrically heated RCS 
engines on the LM. 
plate was installed between the ascent and 
descent stages. During simulations of 
mated operations, this plate was conditioned 
to  a neutral temperature that did not inhibit 
the normal thermal  interface between the 
two spacecraft elements. To simulate the 
operation of the ascent stage alone, the 
plate was cooled with LN2, providing the 
bottom of the ascent stage with a simulated 
space heat sink s imilar  to  that viewed by 
the other spacecraft surfaces. 
Schedule developments resulted in re - 
quirements to conduct tests of the Block I1 
CSM (spacecraft 2TV-1) and the LM (space- 
craft LTA-8) during the same approximate 
time period. As a result of the previous 
tes ts  of spacecraft 008, chamber A was id- 
ready configured for  the CSM, including an 
extensive installation of GSE. Therefore, 
it w a s  logical that the Block 11 CSM testing 
.be continued in that chamber. Using the 
confor mal - skin - he ate r technique , cham be r 
volume requirements for LM testing were minimal; it was determined that the LM 
could be tested conveniently in the smaller chamber B, even though it was a compara- 
tively tight f i t .  The principal requirements were a heat sink, a high vacuum-pumping 
speed, and man-rating provisions, all of which were available in chamber B (fig. 15). 
As mentioned previously, it was necessary to upgrade the pumping capability by the 
addition of a 17" K cryopumping system. Space limitations prevented ful l  deployment 
of the landing gear, but this was not significant when using the skin-heater thermal- 
simulation technique. 
The mission-simulation time line that was selected for  LM testing necessitated 
that the spacecraft be entered and manned during discrete periods without interrupting 
the established environmental conditions. Accommodations for  crewmember r e s t  and 
sleep during the quiet periods between lunar-surface extravehicular excursions were 
considered to be barely acceptable for 116-g lunar conditions, and completely unaccept- 
able under Earth one-g conditions. It was determined that engineering data would not 
be compromised if the crewmen were permitted to leave the spacecraft and the chamber 
for  r e s t  and sleep during these times, provided that the spacecraft hatches were left 
closed, the cabin was pressurized, and all  systems were left configured as if the crew- 
men were still on board. There was some concern about metabolic moisture that would 
be generated by the crewmen during sleep periods. It was believed that the moisture 
might condense on some cool components that had working mechanisms (such as the 
hand controllers) and, when the cabin was depressurized to vacuum, the moisture might 
freeze and interfere with mechanism operation. This condition was simulated during 
one of the t e s t s  by evaporating the correct  amount of moisture into the cabin before de- 
pressurizing for  crew ingress  after a sleep period. No adverse conditions resulted. 
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Figure 15 .- Spacecraft LTA-8 installed 
in chamber B. 
The technique to  be used for  crew 
ingress-egress under the thermal-vacuum 
conditions was probably the most difficult 
conceptual problem presented by the test. 
The spacecraft top hatch was obstructed by 
a special apparatus that was provided to 
simulate CM albedo and thermal emissions 
in docked flight phases. In addition, the 
facility double manlock that was required 
for  inside observer/rescue personnel and 
crew ingress was located at the chamber 
ground-floor level, a considerable distance 
from the top hatch. These two factors  
forced the decision that all ingress-egress 
operations should involve the side hatch 
rather  than the top hatch of the spacecraft. 
This situation still posed a formidable prob- 
lem because the side hatch was located 
13.5 feet above the floor level and, because 
of the dimensions of the hatch, the crewmen 
would have to crawl in on hands and knees. 
The problem was to devise a practical, safe 
scheme that would permit the two crewmen 
to  move from the ground-floor manlock to and through the elevated side hatch, and to  
return. Mobility in the pressurized suit in one-g conditions and the complexity of res- 
cue operations ruled out the use of a ladder (such as the one built onto the landing gear 
s t rut  and used in the lunar-gravity environment). Two alternatives were investigated 
in detail. The first alternative was an elevator concept. This  idea was abandoned be- 
cause of mechanical complexity and a multitude of failure modes that would make emer -  
gency rescue operations difficult o r  impossible. The approach that was adopted was to 
construct a platform opposite the spacecraft side hatch that was large enough to accom- 
modate the crewmen and rescue personnel (fig. 16). This platform was connected by 
stairs to the chamber floor near the manlock (fig. 17). To facilitate rescue of incapac- 
itated crewmen, a foldaway slide was mounted on the stairs (fig. 18). Incapacitated 
crewmen could be brought down the stairs quickly and safely by using the slide and a 
rope tether dropped down by the rescue observer at the top of the platform. 
Two other features of the ingress-egress scheme needed innovation. First, there  
was the requirement to  provide a positive restraint  against falling in case a crewman 
slipped o r  became unconscious during any part of the operation. Closely associated 
with this was the requirement to provide breathable oxygen at the correct  pressure,  
temperature, and flow rate to the pressurized suit while the crewman was in the cham- 
ber.  The first concept attempted involved the use of the flight EVA portable life sup- 
port  system (PLSS) and an overhead suspension block and tackle as a mobility assist 
and falling restraint. Dry runs using the block and tackle were proof that this approach 
was  impractical because the weight and bulk of the PLSS made it extremely difficult to  
climb the stairs and enter the side hatch in a kneeling position. This factor resulted 
in the use of an umbilical t o  supply breathing oxygen from a controlled facility source 
and td provide electrical  service to bioinstrumentation and communication equipment 
in the suit. The umbilical consisted of two 1.25-inch flexible hoses, a 37-conductor 
electrical  cable, and a Beta-cloth cover for thermal  and mechanical protection. The 
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Figure 16. - Lunar module access 
platform. 
Figure 17. - Stairs to access  
platform. 
Figure 18. - Foldaway slide deployed for 
simulated rescue. 
umbilical weighed 2 lb/ft and was relatively 
stiff, the bend radius being limited to  ap- 
proximately 1 .5  feet. Thus, the umbilical 
was somewhat difficult to pull around and to 
stow when not in use. Fortunately, the dual 
set of connectors on the Apollo space sui t  
made it possible to change from one set  of 
umbilicals to another, so  that the length of 
any one umbilical could be kept to  a manage- 
able size by switching umbilicals at appro- 
priate times. Thus, one umbilical was used 
for  initial pumpdown in the manlock and for  
movement between the manlock and the 
chamber, and another umbilical was used to 
move up and down the stairs and into the 
spacecraft. Once in the spacecraft, the 
crewmen switched to the regular LM flight 
umbilicals, which were cross-connected to 
the spacecraft and facility breathing sys- 
tems, and shoved the facility umbilicals 
through the side hatch to the access  platform 
before closing the hatch. An open trough 
w a s  mounted alongside the stair to provide 
for convenient routing of the umbilical while 
the crewmen went up o r  down. When not 
attached to a space suit ,  the supply and 
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return hoses of the facility oxygen umbilicals were shunted together with a bypass f ix-  
ture at the suit end. Oxygen flow was maintained to keep temperature up and to prevent 
any moisture that may have accumulated from freezing. 
With the elimination of the heavy backpack, falling restraints  were required only 
while crewmen were on the stairs and elevated platform. Concepts for automatic falling 
restraints,  which would remain oriented directly over the crewman, were complicated 
by the large range of elevations and translations involved in climbing the stairs. Thus, 
a pair of chest-high restraining s t raps  were developed that were attached to a special 
harness  on the crewman at one end and, at the other end, to movable pipe clamp devices 
that slid freely on pipe rails on each side of the stairs when a slight pressure was ex- 
erted on the extension handles (fig. 19). The crewman could move the clamp along the 
pipe rail quite easily as he ascended o r  descended. If the crewman's hand moved away 
from the rail f o r  any reason, the device would clamp firmly, and the attachment s t rap  
would limit his movement. The s t raps  were attached to the web-belt chest harness  by 
means of hook snaps and D-rings that could be connected anddisconnected easily at the 
bottom of the stairs and on the upper platform. 
The operating details for hard-vacuum ingress and eg res s  and for emergency res- 
cue from all possible locations were worked out by means of d ry  runs on a dimensionally 
correct  mockup of the test installation; the details were finally confirmed by means of 
additional dry runs using the actual test installation. All special hardware (such as the 
folding stairs slide and the falling restraint  
devices) were prequalified for use by func- 
tional tests that involved operation through 
the ful l  range of temperatures from am- 
bient to 80" K. 
Several special provisions were nec- 
essary  in the ground tests of the LM as a 
result  of design limitations on cabin pres- 
sure.  Because the LM was intended 
strictly f o r  space operations, the cabin was 
designed to withstand internal pressure 
only. Vents used to depressurize the cabin 
during flight operations were not capable of 
passing sufficient gas  flow into the cabin 
to  prevent substantial negative pressure 
during emergency repressurization of the 
test chamber. To prevent structural  col- 
lapse of the cabin under this emergency 
contingency situation, the hinge pins of the 
cabin side hatch (which opened into the 
cabin) were redesigned to act as shear pins 
during the test. This would permit the side 
hatch to open automatically during emer-  
gency repressurization, providing a large 
flow area and preventing negative cabin 
pressure.  The shear-pin design also made 
it easier for  rescue personnel to remove 
the hatch and enter the cabin in case an 
Figure 19. - Falling restraint system 
and umbilical connections. 
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incapacitated crewman obstructed normal hatch opening. As additional assurance that 
the hatch would come open with minimum negative-pressure differential, the hinge pins 
were removed each time the cabin was pressurized and were replaced before each de-  
pressurization. In practice, the fragile shear-type hinge pins were a nuisance because 
they were difficult to remove and replace without breaking, necessitating that the hatch 
be opened and closed with extra  care .  On one occasion, a pin broke as the hatch was 
being closed after crew egress .  Rather than abort the tes t ,  the crewmen waited until 
the next regular manning to replace the pin under hard-vacuum conditions by the use of 
a special tool that was quickly designed and fabricated for  that purpose. 
Normal flight dumps of LM cabin pressure directly to the chamber would have 
overwhelmed the chamber high-vacuum-pumping systems to the extent that the required 
thermal-vacuum test conditions would have been violated. Because of this fact, the 
cabin pressure  was dumped through a pipe to  the facility roughing system, which had 
the capacity to handle the flow but at a higher pressure ( ~ 1  x 
chamber volume. This pipe was connected to the cabin by a metal  plate, which replaced 
the left-hand flight window. As the cabin pressure approached the low pressure limit 
of the facility roughing system and as discharge flow came within range of the facility 
high-vacuum -pumping system, the regular cabin valve permitted dumping the remaining 
cabin pressure directly to the chamber. 
to r r )  than that in the 
Block I1 command and service module tests. - The experience gained in tests of 
the Block I CSM in chamber A confirmed the desirability of the block simulation t ime 
line and the validity of the basic test configuration. Tes t s  of the Block I1 CSM space- 
craf t  2TV-1, therefore, were also planned with a block simulation t ime line with mini- 
mum changes in test configuration from that proven previously. Freon T F  was  
substituted as  the dummy propellant for  the water/glycol mixture that was used pre-  
viously to eliminate a remote flammability hazard. Admittedly, there  were special 
hazards  associated with Freon TF in this  application, particularly the possibility of 
generating toxic gases  if the Freon was exposed to a g ross  conflagration; however, the 
advantages of Freon TF outweighed the disadvantages of the water/glycol mixture. 
The most significant change to  the test configuration was the addition of the full 
640-pound flight load of cryogenic oxygen on board the spacecraft for  use during testing. 
This change resulted from an urgent need to confirm integrated thermal  conditions and 
proper functioning in areas where cold oxygen from the tanks was routed. A new re- 
view of special safety hazards was undertaken because of this  quantity of high-pressure 
liquid oxygen (LO2) in the confined chamber. A g ross  rupture of either of the two tanks 
was considered to be very unlikely. The most probable mode of failure that might pro- 
duce a real hazard was  a small  o r  medium leak in the oxygen system that could build 
up locally an oxygen-rich atmosphere in a poorly vented compartment to an extent suf- 
ficient to sustain combustion. The top deck of the service module (SM), where oxygen 
piping was close to a large amount of electronic equipment that had potential ignition 
sources,  was  a typical suspect area. In postulating such a leak and subsequent ignition, 
it was  believed that the principal threat to crew safety and catastrophic destruction of 
the spacecraft could be relieved by quickly removing the large stored quantity of LO2 
f rom the spacecraft  to  a remote location where the supply of oxygen could be isolated. 
For  th i s  purpose, a stainless-steel  dump tank was located within the chamber, sus-  
pended underneath the rotating floor. Special piping and valves were installed to per -  
mit  dumping the LO f rom the flight tanks through the fill-line inverted standpipes to  2 
the tank (fig. 20). Forcing pressure was maintained in the flight tanks during the dump 
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Figure 20. - Schematic diagram, LO dump system. 2 
by pressurizing the vent line with gaseous nitrogen. After the tanks were emptied, the 
nitrogen flow through the vent line was maintained to  purge the system. The system 
was designed to  accomplish the transfer of liquid to  the dump tank in 3 minutes o r  less, 
although, as will be discussed elsewhere in this report, th is  t ime was exceeded in all 
tests of the system. Once the liquid was in the dump tank, it was vaporized slowly 
and was mixed with nitrogen in such a way that the gas  mixture discharged to the cham- 
ber approximated the normal oxygen/nitrogen mixture of natural  air. Thus, there  were 
no special flammability or asphyxiation hazards  posed fo r  other activities in the 
chamber. 
An additional precaution was taken that was related to  the special flammability 
hazards  posed by the LO2 load. The facility water-deluge fire-suppression system 
was extended to  provide water spray nozzles that covered the cryotank shelf area in the 
service module. It was believed that, in event of an oxygen-fed fire, this water deluge 
could delay gross structural damage to the SM long enough to detank the oxygen supply. 
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TEST OPERATIONS 
The obvious similari ty between major thermal-vacuum tests and actual flight op- 
erat ions led to the adoption of as many of the flight program management concepts and 
techniques as were feasible. The first tests conducted on the Block I CSM in 1966 iden- 
tified many of the strong points and weaknesses in these adaptations. By the t ime that 
final preparations fo r  Block I1 CSM and LM testing were in full swing in the last quar- 
ter of 1967, several  improvements had been made that smoothed these operations con- 
siderably. Another major factor in shaping the overall  operation was the general  safety 
review of ground tes t  activity, which was undertaken by MSC after the fire during check- 
out of spacecraft 204 at the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in ear ly  1967. 
The general  effect of this review was to formalize requirements for  detailed attention 
to many of the test planning and operational a r eas  that had lacked specific and uniform 
guide line s previous 1 y . 
Man age me n t Coo rd i n at i o n 
The scope of the activity and the large number of different organizations directly 
involved in the tests made the development of an adequate management concept a partic- 
ularly demanding task. The Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO), which was  the 
source of all programmatic direction and support, was given the overall  responsibility 
for  the test program. However, the detailed planning and implementation of the pro- 
gram outlined by ASPO fell primarily to  the Engineering and Development (E&D) Direc- 
torate facility operating staff and support contractors, to the spacecraft prime 
contractors, and to  the E&D spacecraft subsystem managers and supporting institutional 
staffs. In addition, elements of many other organizations played key ro les  in biomedi- 
cal services,  quality engineering and control, safety surveillance, data reduction, and 
many institutional supportive services.  At the peak of activity in mid-1968, approxi- 
mately 1200 persons, representing over a dozen MSC directorate- o r  company-level 
organizations, were engaged full t ime on the thermal-vacuum test  program a t  MSC. 
To facilitate local operations, ASPO delegated authority to  the SESL laboratory manager 
for  within-scope direction of the onsite spacecraft contractors. The SE SL laboratory 
manager a lso was authorized to  arrange and coordinate serv ices  of all other elements 
contributing to the program. Written management plans were developed and published 
for  each test series; in these plans, the responsibilities and coordinating mechanisms 
peculiar to that series were delineated. This general scheme was strengthened further 
for  the Block I1 CSM and LM tes t s  by the appointment of a test manager for  each tes t  
series. The test  manager reported directly to the Apollo Program manager and the 
SESL laboratory manager, and was delegated full authority to  act fo r  both in all mat te rs  
relating to preparation and performance of the assigned test series. 
A major  area of activity was the coordination of test plans and procedures through 
all of the different organizations that had a special interest  o r  responsibility. Because 
of the requirement to act quickly, this coordination problem w a s  greatly compounded 
when it came to review of changes to procedures and time lines that were proposed 
while a test was underway. Each test generated proposals for changes to account fo r  
real-t ime contingencies (for example, equipment o r  instrumentation failure, unexpected 
spacecraft  performance, and so forth). The NASA test  director  had the ultimate author- 
ity to  direct such real-t ime changes as he considered necessary to obtain test objectives 
23 
and ensure safety; however, when time permitted, a thorough analysis of proposed 
changes by a board of experts  provided advantages. A test review board, which was on 
short-notice call  throughout the test, w a s  established to review and authorize proposed 
changes. The test review board consisted of senior representatives of ASPO, the 
spacecraft contractor, the facility operations staff, and the medical and safety offices, 
who could evaluate each proposed change for  impact on all aspects of the operation. 
Test -Team Concept , 
A test team of approximately 85 facility and data system operations personnel, 
approximately 65 spacecraft and GSE operations personnel, and 15 to 20 miscellaneous 
personnel fo r  medical surveillance, quality assurance,  safety monitoring, and so forth, 
was required at  any  given time on officially designated duty stations to  conduct a tes t .  
Most of these test-team members  were on 12-hour shifts; however, certain key person- 
nel on safety-critical stations were limited to 8-hour shifts. In addition, an engineering 
support team of approximately 35 people per  shift evaluated data  in real time and ad- 
vised the tes t  director and test review board concerning unanticipated problems. Thus, 
a total complement of more than 400 persons w a s  needed for  real-t ime operations. 
1 
1 
The test team (fig. 21) was formally organized into appropriate sections that were I 
{ 
I 
disciplined to ca r ry  out the operation in strict accordance with the preestablished pro- 
cedures  and test rules .  Twenty intercom channels were available to link this  team by 
means of voice communication; the tes t s  usually involved approximately 10 of these 
channels. The major sections of the test team were (1) those sections required to 
operate the facility (which reported to the facility test conductor), (2) those sections 
required to operate the spacecraft and associated GSE (which reported to  the space- 
medical monitor). Each of these sections was divided further,  where necessary,  into 
systems groups headed by a lead technician o r  engineer. The test director was in over- 
all control of real-time activities, and all sections of the test team reported to him 
through the channels described previously. 
I 
craft  test conductor), and (3) the biomedical support section (which reported to the I 
I 
I 
Communications with the test crewmen were handled by the test director,  except 
for  medical matters,  which were handled directly between the crewmen and the flight 
surgeon serving as medical monitor. To expedite anomaly investigation and to  trouble- 
tions between the crewmen and the appropriate systems engineer. Drawing on earlier 
flight experience, an unrecorded "private line" communications channel was installed 
(for the first tes t s )  between the crewmen and the medical monitor for  uninhibited dis-  
cussion of confidential medical mat ters .  Although special efforts were made to res t r ic t  
the use of this  voice channel to that purpose, on several  occasions the private line was 
used for  off-the-record preliminary discussion of nonmedical problems, which resulted 
in confusing the record of several  significant events and in incomplete coordination of 
activities. For  this  reason, the private line was omitted from later tests. 
, 
shoot special problems, occasionally the test director  authorized direct  communica- 
~ 
I 
i 
I 
( 
During the tes ts ,  the test director,  test conductors, medical monitors, and most 
of the lead systems engineers and technicians were located in  one of two central  control 
rooms (fig. 22) that were somewhat remote from the chambers.  The other test-team 
members  were at local control stations throughout the facility. One such station was  
that of the crew-support conductor (fig. 23), whose console was directly in front of the 
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Figure 21. - Test-team organization. 
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chamber manlocks. There, he could maintain close visual contact with the crewmen 
in EVA and with his team of inside observers,  manlock operators,  and facility ECS 
operators.  Crew ingress-egress  operations required mutual cooperation within this  
team; therefore, during those segments of the tes ts ,  control of crew action was t rans-  
ferred temporarily f rom the tes t  director to the crew-support conductor. 
Emergency repressurization of the chamber represented a powerful tool with 
which to cope rapidly with a variety of in-chamber emergencies. No precise parallel 
for  this  capability existed in the flight operation, although there  was some operational 
similari ty between initiating emergency repressurization and actuation of the flight 
launch escape system. As with the flight launch escape system, initiation of chamber 
emergency repressurization irrevocably committed the test to traumatic events, which 
should be risked only in case of a compelling, overriding situation posing an immediate, 
severe  threat to crew safety. Among the contingencies involved were possible rupture 
of eardrums,  s t ructural  damage to the s>acecraft by rapidly changing pressure  loads, 
e lectr ical  corona o r  arc discharge if interlocks failed to work, rapid cooling of space- 
craf t  and other components in the chamber as a result  of convective heat t ransfer  to 
the cold walls, and back contamination of the spacecraft by water and other chamber 
cold-wall cryogen deposits caused by uncontrolled release. In addition, if  the crewmen 
were in pressurized space sui ts  a t  the time that emergency repressurization occurred, 
the possibility existed that they would encounter dangerous negative pressure  on the suit 
if equipment built into the ECS to prevent this condition failed. During manned activity 
in the manlocks o r  chamber, a capability was available to automatically initiate emer -  
gency repressurization of either,  in event of loss  of space-suit p ressure .  This capa- 
bility consisted of three barostats mounted on a biomedical instrumentation harness  
that was  worn by the crewman. The barostats  were wired to the chamber- 
repressurization circuit  in such a manner that a pressure less than 2 . 2  psia measured 
by any two of the sensors  would initiate the emergency repressurization. Philosophical 
questions were raised regarding responsibility and capability for  manual initiation of 
emergency repressurization. Considerable discussion and negotiations were needed 
before a completely satisfactory scheme could be determined. There w a s  no doubt that 
the test director,  who had the ultimate responsibility for  real-t ime test operations and 
crew safety, should have the authority to  initiate emergency repressurization when he 
deemed it necessary. In addition, because of the t ime-crit ical  nature of hypobaric 
medical emergencies, it was deemed necessary to provide the medical monitor with 
unilateral authority to initiate emergency repressurization. Systems technicians 
checked out and armed the system before chamber manning was performed; however, 
the pr imary control for  initiation of emergency repressurization was on the console of 
the medical monitor. A controversy a rose  because the crewmen wanted to have a 
switch that would give them independent capability to  initiate emergency repre  ssur iza-  
tion. Many parallels in the flight operation for independent crew action in event of 
emergency were cited in support of this  request.  Opposing arguments centered around 
the fact that one of the ear ly  symptoms of hypoxia is loss  of judgment. It was feared 
that a crewman suffering from a mild case of hypoxia might initiate emergency repres-  
surization solely because of confusion a t  a time when a less traumatic repressurization 
rate would be safer  and much more desirable.  This  matter was resolved by the issu-  
ance of a mission rule that required immediate, mandatory chamber repressurization 
whenever the crewmen called f o r  it. The question of repressurization rate was left 
unanswered, with the responsibility for  final determination left to the medical monitor 
and the test director. In practice, the mutual respect and confidence in test-team pro- 
ficiency, which was developed during the many planning conferences and test dry  runs  
with crewmember participation, relegated this  controversy to insignificance. 
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Because of the large number of organizations involved, it was  not practicable to 
devise a completely unified, standardized program for  proficiency training of test-team 
members.  Instead, each organization was held separately responsible for  training and 
certification of its own personnel. The SESL laboratory management audited the sev- 
eral programs for  adequacy and accepted certification from the various organizations 
for  specific team members  before each test. Proficiency in special systems and spe- 
cialty areas was obtained by a combination of classroom and on-the-job training. In 
addition, all test-team members  were required to complete standardized formal  courses  
in first aid and firefighting (with emphasis on oxygen-rich fires), in SESL facility famil- 
iarization, and in high-altitude physiology. There were three different courses  in high- 
altitude physiology, and detail was  appropriate to the test-team position in each 
individual case.  Crewmembers and inside observers who were required to work in a 
reduced-pressure environment were given a physiology training course equivalent to  
that given to U.S.  Air Force crewmembers  who fly at high altitudes. This  course in- 
cluded a training run in an altitude chamber. Other test-team members  who were in- 
volved directly in crew activity and support (for example, test directors ,  crew-support 
conductors, ECS operators,  and so forth) received the same training except that an ac- 
tual run in an altitude chamber was not required. Based on the premise that general  
familiarity with the hazards  to  be experienced by the crewmen and inside observers  
might provide excellent motivation for  anyone involved in the test, all other test-team 
members  were required to participate in a very short  course in high-altitude physiology. 
A very important aspect of test-team training was the dry  runs.  These dry runs  
were conducted a t  many levels and served not only to familiarize test-team members  
with the operations and to  improve proficiency, but a lso to cor rec t  o r  improve the pro- 
cedures  and to develop intercom discipline. For some test-team members,  such as the 
crew-support team of inside observers,  manlock operators,  and ECS operators,  repet- 
itive timed dry runs of the various normal, off-normal, and emergency procedures 
were a major activity for  months before the test (fig. 24). At another level, key mem- 
be r s  of the tes t  team participated in ear ly  around-the-table read-throughs of the inte- 
grated tes t  procedure as soon as it became available in each circumstance. These 
read-throughs were aimed primarily at identifying discrepancies in the procedures, 
but also served as familiarization exercises  for the participants. At least one on- 
station d ry  run with almost all of the test-team members  participating was held before 
each new test. Many t imes it was possible to power up some of the spacecraft  and GSE 
systems and have them operating during the ambient dry  runs. This  practice provided 
late operational verification of the system before going into the test, and added real ism 
to  the exercise.  Simulated emergencies were included in the dry runs. In several  of 
the ear ly  dry  runs,  test-team proficiency was considered substandard and, after de-  
tailed critiques, the dry  runs were repeated. 
News-media interest  in the test operations performed in 1968 was unusually high 
fo r  a nonflight activity. This interest  probably resulted from the striking similari ty to 
flight operations and the involvement of astronauts as test crewmen, combined with the 
fact  that there  had been no manned flight activity since the end of the Gemini Program, 
and public interest  was  focused on any key events leading to  the first manned Apollo 
flights. Pretest and post-test news conferences involving the crewmen and key labora- 
tory and program-office personnel were well attended and widely reported in the news 
media. A duty station f o r  the Public Affairs Office (PAO) representative was estab- 
lished in the control room, and facil i t ies were provided for him to make real-t ime 
voice repor t s  on progress  to an area set aside for  the press .  In addition, real-time 
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Figure 24. - Timed rescue drill in LM 
test  setup. 
voice from the communication loop of the 
test director and closed circuit television 
pictures from the test chamber o r  f rom in- 
side the spacecraft were fed to  this news- 
room during periods of special activity. 
This practice proved to be an excellent 
method of training and familiarization with 
Apollo spacecraft operation for  personnel 
who served subsequently at the P A 0  con- 
sole in the Mission Control Center during 
Apollo flights. 
Documentation and Configuration 
Control 
Insofar as the test spacecraft and GSE 
were concerned, the work authorization and 
configuration control system designed and 
implemented by the ASPO for  program-wide 
use was enforced rigorously during the site 
activation, test preparation, and test and 
post-test activities. Interface control documents (ICD), which were a feature of this 
system, were prepared to define the l imits of responsibility where the spacecraft or 
GSE interfaced with the facility. An ICD contained not only data relative to  location, 
dimensions, tolerances, and loads, but also, when appropriate, information concerning 
fluid-flow conditions and electrical characterist ics.  Work-authorization procedures 
for the facility were similar to those used on the spacecraft and GSE except that the 
authorization of configuration changes was the responsibility of the laboratory staff 
ra ther  than the ASPO. The configuration of many facility systems was not controlled 
as rigorously as the configuration of the spacecraft and GSE systems. Instead, certain 
facility systems that were considered to be safety cri t ical  (environmental control, emer-  
gency repressurization, electrical  power, biomedical instrumentation, and fire- 
suppression systems) were designated as needing complete, detailed configuration 
control. It w a s  known that the remaining systems had inaccuracies in the engineering 
drawings of record, and the operation of these systems was verified primarily by means 
of functional checkouts. This was a practical matter dictated by the construction history 
of the facility and limitations on the resources  that were available for  configuration 
verification. 
The test plan was the overall basic document that specified the requirements for  
the test and defined such primary i tems as what spacecraft would be used, where the 
tes t  would be conducted, what GSE would be involved, and so forth. The integrating 
contractor f o r  the Apollo Program prepared a ground operation test plan that covered, 
in general terms,  the thermal-vacuum tests on the CSM and LM and other tests (such 
as structural, acoustical, vibrational, and so forth) which together comprised the total 
ground test program. Later, the prime contractor for  the LM compiled a more detailed 
test plan that covered the SESL tests of the LM exclusively. 
The specific objectives of the test were contained in Certification Test Require- 
ment (CTR) documents. Timely and successful accomplishment of each CTR was a 
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contractual requirement and was directly associated with contract incentives. A CTR 
was issued only for the most essential  and crucial  spacecraft performance demonstra- 
tions; attention to  secondary objectives and to many anomalies of an unanticipated nature 
was somewhat inhibited because these factors did not receive the same contractual em- 
phasis. Nevertheless, CTR documents served an essential  function by providing the 
specific mechanism whereby the test activity could be integrated directly into mas ter  
Apollo Program plans. 
A procedure for  performing checkout of various spacecraft systems and GSE, 
either individually or  as integrated units, was  called an Operational Checkout Procedure 
(OCP). Wherever possible, commonality was maintained in these procedures for  opera- 
t ions at the manufacturing plant, at the test site, and at the launch site, although pecu- 
liarities at the various sites (mainly associated with the local facility interfaces or 
minor differences in local GSE installations) made some deviations inevitable. Check- 
out and operation of facility systems were accomplished by using standard operating 
procedures (SOP), which were, by and large, independent of the vagaries of the instant 
test program. 
Real-time test operations were performed according to a Development Tes t  Pro-  
cedure (DTP), which comprised a detailed procedural document that was unique to  each 
test. The DTP contained step-by-step commands and responses to be executed by the 
test team from the beginning to  the end of the test (figs. 25 and 26). Routine operation 
of a subsystem was explained by reference to  the appropriate OCP or  SOP ra ther  than 
by reprinting the complete established procedure in the DTP. Even with these attempts 
at abbreviation, each DTP was a voluminous document, typically consisting of approxi- 
mately 2000 pages in 9 volumes and containing more than 35 000 discrete procedural 
steps. Preparing, editing, and updating each DTP was a major undertaking. To assist 
in this  activity, computer card decks containing the various s teps  were prepared, and 
programs fo r  printout were designed, which permitted late editing. Copies of the final 
printed DTP reproduced by means of offset printing were distributed to each test-team 
member. Safety regulations required that the final updated version of the DTP be de- 
livered to  each test-team member no later than 24 hours before dry runs and no later 
than 48 hours  before an actual test. After those t imes,  changes could be made only 
with specific approval f rom the level of the MSC Director.  
Decisions as to  what course of action to  take in the event of off-nominal or emer-  
gency conditions were preplanned and printed in a section of the DTP called "test rules" 
(fig. 27). The off-nominal and emergency procedures, if peculiar to the test, were 
also contained in the DTP. If the procedures were standard, they were contained in the 
OCP o r  SOP and were distinguished from routine procedures by being printed on a fold- 
out page or  on contrasting-color paper. 
As each test progressed, quality-control personnel monitored the communications 
network and stamped each procedural step complete as i t  was accomplished. Each un- 
authorized deviation from the procedure, nonconformance with the procedure, o r  mal- 
function of equipment was documented by the quality-control monitors on an Interim 
Discrepancy Report (IDR) form. Subsequently, each IDR was reviewed by the engineers 
responsible f o r  the system involved, who made a determination of the significance of 
the event or condition noted. If fur ther  investigation, procedural changes, equipment 
modification, o r  repa i r  were needed, the IDR was converted to  an official Discrepancy 
Report and entered in the quality-control logs for  tracking until final disposition was 
made; otherwise, the IDR was canceled. 
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Denotes that an intc 
discrepancy report 
(no. 016) was logged 
against this step - 
Command initiating station rr Recipient station 
Figure 25. - Typical page from CSM development test procedure. 
Denotes that this step has 
been superseded a deviation 
sheet with the number recorde 
Recipient station 
s- 2-30 
01P-8-90W3-LTl-8i IOIO.)  
k t c  1O/Oh/68  
Quality control ceriification 
01 step completion 
Figure 26. - Typical page from L M  development test procedure. 
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SPACE ENVIRONMENT SIMULAT I ON L9BORATORY 
THERYOVlCUUY TEST RULES 
CONOIlION/MALFUNCl ION 
1. LOSS OF BOTH PRIMARY AND 
SECONDARY COOLING LOOPS 
2. R U P ’ N R D  GLYCOL L I N E  I N  
CAB1 N 
FAILURE OF BOTH S U I T  COMPRES- 
SORS 
1. C F E 4  SUITED, CABIN D E R E S -  
SURIZED 
2. CREW SUITED, CABIN PRES- 
SURIZD 
3.  CREW UNSUITED, CABIN PRFS- 
S U I R I Z E D  
FAILURE OF Bo?H WATER CYCLIC 
ACCUMJJATORS 
FAILURE OF BOW RE(;LILATORS I N  
ME FOLLOWING VALVES: 
1. MAIN OXYGEN PRESSUPJ3 
REGULATOR 
2.. EMERGENCY CABIN PRESSURE 
REGULAMR VALVE 
3 .  CABIN PRESSURE REGULATOR 
4. TANK PRESSURE REGULATOR 
5 .  DEMAND PRESSURE REGULATOR 
- 
PHASE - 
’ACECR 
ALL 
ALL 
ALL 
ALL 
RULING 
~~ 
’ ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
1. POWER S / C  DOWN TO MINIMIM 
POWER AND ABORT - MODE I11 
2. ABORT - MODE I11 
ABORT - MODE 1 
ABORT - NODE I1 
CREW DOFF HELMETS IMMEDIATELY 
ABORT - MODE DEPENDING UPON 
RISING LEVEL OF Cg 
HOLD AND EVALUATE; ABORT I F  
CONDITION C A ” C T  BE CORRECTED 
AND CABIN ENVIRONMENT BEC0MT:S 
INTOLERABLE. 
HOI,D AND -EVALUATE IF ANY ONE 0 
TWO S I D E S  OF DIE T.IS”ED VALVES 
FAILS. FAILURE OF WTH SIDES 
OF ANY ONE O F  THE 5 ,  ABORT. 
-
CUES/nOlES/COYMENlS 
CREW EON 02 MASKS 
2 0 ,  LEVEL DETECTED BY GSE GAS 
X K P L I N G  
I f C  f o r m  2382 (Apr 8 8 )  ( 0 1 )  
Figure 27. - Typical page from test rules .  
The reporting of testing activity and results was  done by each group that had spe- 
cialized interests  in the tes ts .  The problem was  not that sec tors  of the activity went 
unreported, but ra ther  that there were too many reports,  each prepared from the view- 
point of a narrow interest  that frequently ignored the potential value of the report  to  
other interests.  A unified report  that covered all aspects of facility and spacecraft 
performance was never issued. As a result, no in-depth integrated analysis to cor re-  
late the subtleties of facility performance with spacecraft performance was  prepared. 
Safety and Readiness Reviews 
Much of the credit  for the successful accomplishment of these complicated t e s t  
operations and f o r  the outstanding safety record associated with them in view of the 
unusual safety hazards  involved must go to the system of readiness review. This  sys-  
tem w a s  developed to provide management overview of test  planning and to  ensure de- 
tailed attention to all cri t ical  a reas .  Early in the construction phase of MSC, a need 
was identified f o r  formal  certification of new major test facilities for initial operation. 
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Before 1967, there were no generally accepted safety c r i te r ia  governing the de- 
sign and operation of man-rated high-vacuum chambers. In laboratories engaged in 
this  and similar activities, the practices were based mainly on the judgment and expe- 
rience of each individual laboratory staff, along with the normal information exchange 
afforded by the l i terature and technical symposia of interested agencies and technical 
societies. Uniform, mandatory requirements f o r  most design and operational features 
were completely lacking, and this void placed a burden (which sometimes was insur- 
mountable) on the facility operator to justify the time and expense involved in providing 
many of the high-quality safety features  that subsequently have been recognized as 
"minimum. " Attention w a s  focused sharply on this  problem in ear ly  1967 by the fire 
in spacecraft  204 while it was undergoing preflight checks at KSC. Shortly thereafter,  
another fire occurred that involved an oxygen-rich atmosphere in a chamber at the 
U. S. Air Force School of Aviation Medicine in San Antonio, Texas. As a corollary to 
the investigation of these accidents, a survey of practices used in man-rated ground 
test facilities was undertaken, and the variances immediately became apparent. A s  a 
i 
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By the time that SESL was near  completion, this  procedure had evolved into a formal  
operational readiness inspection (ORI), whereby a committee of senior management 
personnel, who were representative of several  pr imary disciplines (for example, engi- 
neering, test, quality control, safety, occupational medicine, and so forth), performed 
an in-depth review of the facility and all operational planning to determine its readiness  
for  activation. The f i r s t  SESL OR1 was performed in 1965, and resulted in identification 
of 127 discrepant conditions o r  deficiencies that had to  be corrected before the first tes t .  
Facility changes and procedural upgrading, which resulted from the new formal  safety 
requirements that were inaugurated ear ly  in 1967, were considered to be sufficiently 
extensive to warrant another OR1 before continuing tes t  operations. In this  instance, 
73 discrepant items and deficiencies were identified and corrected.  In addition to these 
very broad general reviews, immediate readiness to undertake a specific test was, in 
each case,  reviewed and certified by a Test Readiness Review Board (TRRB). This  
activity roughly paralleled the flight readiness reviews that were held before each flight, 
f rom which precedent was  drawn. Generally, the boards were composed of division- 
chief level o r  higher personnel; also, the boards had varied disciplinary representation 
that was similar to  OR1 committees. The OR1 committees and the TRR boards con- 
sisted of knowledgeable people who were not ordinarily involved in the routine operation 
of the laboratory; therefore,  these reviews afforded a very meaningful, impartial  judg- 
ment that was completely additional to the normal efforts of the facility staff, and these 
reviews were instrumental in carrying over the experience of the board and committee 
members  from other s imilar  or related operations. 
SPECIAL GROUND TEST PROBLEMS 
During the course of the thermal-vacuum tes t  program, a large number of special 
problems were encountered that were more o r  less unique to  this  type of specialized ac- 
tivity. This  section of the report  will deal with a few of these problems, which were 
selected primarily on the basis  that discussion may be of benefit to  others  undertaking 
s imilar  tests. No attempt has  been made to present them in an order  of significance. 
Ground Test Safety Cr i te r ia  
result ,  a special task team was formed at MSC t o  develop a set of minimum safety stand- 
ards, and these standards were issued as requirements in a special section of the MSC 
safety manual. These safety requirements were imposed immediately on all ground 
tes t  activities involved in the NASA manned space programs,  and, subsequently, the re- 
quirements served as the basis fo r  an industry-wide standard issued by the American 
Society fo r  Testing Materials. In general, the minimum requirements were written in 
broad t e r m s  that were suitable fo r  a variety of detailed implementation methods, which 
allowed flexibility for  variable laboratory needs. Emphasis was  placed on ensuring ade- 
quate expert  attention to each of the various facets of design and operation, as opposed 
to  a rigid specification of detail. However, in a few matters,  it was considered neces- 
sa ry  to specify detailed restrictions;  for  example, the unequivocal requirement for  
Teflon in-chamber wiring insulation to the exclusion of others. Other, less specific 
design requirements were directed toward such i tems  as communications, electric - 
circuitry protection, emergency-repressurization provisions, breathing systems, and 
so forth. Additional sections of the standards dealt with test-team training, qualifica- 
tion, and certification; quality control; safety monitoring; test documentation; single- 
point failure analyses; medical surveillance; material  control; and test-checkout 
operations. The final determination of whether the specific implementations of these 
general  requirements were adequate was left to the OR1 committees that were required 
to  review each facility and major test setup. 
Materials Control 
As mentioned previously, configuration control of the spacecraft and the Apollo- 
common GSE involved in the tests was vested with the ASPO. Of course, this control 
included a closely governed inventory of all materials used in the spacecraft. As a re- 
sult, the tes t  spacecraft received the same careful attention as the flight spacecraft, 
with identical res t r ic t ions being imposed with regard to flammability, toxicity, and 
odor. Materials on the spacecraft that were to be exposed to the space environment 
(as  opposed to the cabin environment) were selected primarily on the basis of satis- 
factory physical properties that would not degrade to  an unacceptable level during the 
mission. Flammability was a consideration, but requirements were not as restr ic t ive 
as with mater ia ls  that were exposed to the oxygen-rich cabin atmosphere. As long as 
the functional properties of these external materials were not affected, weight loss  be- 
cause of vacuum exposure was not a consideration. However, vacuum outgassing of 
spacecraft mater ia ls  was of great  concern to the facility operator because it could be a 
major constituent of the gas  load that had to  be processed by the facility pumping sys- 
tem; also, some outgassing constituents could plate out and permanently degrade criti- 
cal chamber components (such as solar-simulator collimating mirrors) .  Nevertheless, 
it seemed unrealistic to attempt to  impose additional material  specification restr ic t ions 
on the  spacecraft for  the sole purpose of minimizing chamber damage; thus, no such 
attempts were made. 
Although configuration control of the facility was a separate responsibility of the 
facility operator, the selection and control of mater ia ls  in the facility ECS, which pro- , 
vided breathable oxygen to EVA crewmen in the chamber, exactly conformed to  the 
standards established f o r  the spacecraft cabins and breathing systems. In addition to  
normal  functional specifications, other in-chamber mater ia ls  had special requirements 
imposed f o r  vacuum compatibility that were designed to minimize chamber back contam- 
ination. All nonmetallic mater ia ls  were reviewed by a special facility mater ia ls  review 
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board, and certain metallic mater ia ls  that had borderline vapor pressures  a t  nominal 
temperatures (such as cadmium and zinc) were prohibited unconditionally f rom in- 
chamber use. 
Fai lure Modes and Effects Analysis 
The safety requirements written in 1967 required that systems-failure-mode anal- 
yses  be performed on the facility, the test article, the GSE, and the integrated combina- 
tion of these three. A special note stated that, W n e  basic cri terion that must be 
maintained inviolate in manned testing is as follows: Test personnel shall  not be sub- 
jected to a test environment wherein a credible single-point failure will resul t  in injury. *I 
Satisfactory implementation of this  requirement was difficult initially because of vary- 
ing opinions as to what exactly constituted a failure modes and effects analysis in the 
context of the requirement. Techniques f o r  analysis to determine failure modes and to  
identify potential single -point failure sources  were,  of course,  well developed at this  
t ime and had been used previously in reviewing spacecraft systems. Most analyses of 
this type had involved an examination of systems down to the individual component level 
( res is tors ,  transistors,  seals, connectors, valve components, and so forth) and were 
very time consuming and very expensive. Because of the t ime and expense considera- 
tions, it seemed impractical  to apply the same philosophy to  the extensive facility sys-  
tems.  Therefore, a much more generalized but effective technique was adopted. In 
simple terms,  it was postulated that major facility components, systems, and serv ices  
would fail in gross,  credible modes; and the effects upon operation were examined. If 
something could fail, it was assumed to  do so without the detailed studies necessary to  
identify every possible cause for  such failure. Then, the rule  was applied that there  
must be redundancy, operational alternatives, o r  backout procedures so that the failure 
would not jeopardize crew safety. Although not required specifically by the safety 
standards, the analyses were extended to the failure modes that would resul t  in signif- 
icant damage to the spacecraft o r  facility; where possible, changes were made to avoid 
such damage. The failure modes and effects analyses of the spacecraft developed for  
flight operational purposes were more than adequate for  this  purpose and required only 
that deviations from flight configuration, which were peculiar to the ground tes t  space- 
craft, be considered further.  Then, the spacecraft and facility analyses were consid- 
ered together to  determine the interrelated effects of single-point failures in either.  
In practice, this technique permitted performance of an effective analysis at nominal 
cost. Most of the unacceptable conditions disclosed by the analyses could be corrected 
by procedural changes, although a few hardware changes also were involved. 
Facil i ty and Spacecraft F i re  Protection 
The ground test fire incidents of ear ly  1967 resulted in extensive studies of fire- 
suppression systems for  use in reduced pressure,  oxygen-rich, habitable areas. The 
extraordinary measures  that were taken to  minimize the use of combustible materials,  
t o  limit fire-propagation paths, and to  eliminate ignition sources  were complemented 
by the provision of fire-suppression apparatus for  use if the other precautions failed 
and a conflagration occurred. The pr imary candidates fo r  consideration as extinguish- 
ing elements were water, foam, carbon dioxide (CO ), and Freon. The use of foam 
extinguishers that could be discharged into the sectionalized cabin compartments was  
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adopted for  the CM. Also, this  flight system was  considered to be adequate for  the 
ground test operation and was accepted without special modification for  that purpose. 
The LM depended on water spray from the in-cabin potable-water drinking nozzle fo r  
fire extinguishing. This  same system w a s  used in the ground test, except that an exter- 
nal facility water supply was connected to the nozzle to provide an unlimited amount of 
water to be used in an emergency. 
In considering what type of fire-suppression system would be best for  in-chamber 
use lex terna l  to the spacecraft), it was f i r s t  noted that oxygen-rich environments would 
not be encountered, except possibly at highly localized spots where a leak in an oxygen 
system might exist. Moreover, the vacuum in the chamber during test operations 
would, in itself, constitute an effective fire-suppression agent. Therefore, the greatest  
fire hazards  were recognized to  exist during the pretest  buildup and checkout phases in 
the confined chamber areas at atmospheric pressure.  Hazards also existed during the 
pumpdown and repressurization phases of test operation, when chamber pressure  was 
still high enough to support combustion. Of the possible extinguishing elements consid- 
ered in  detail, water delivered by deluge nozzles was determined to be the most effective 
and to have no unacceptable operational disadvantages. A foam system was too expen- 
sive, required too much time to f i l l  the chamber volume, and presented severe visibil- 
ity problems fo r  condition assessment  and rescue operations. Carbon dioxide was 
extremely expensive and presented toxicity hazards to  the test crewmen, rescue 
personnel, and operations personnel. Except in very high concentrations, Freon was 
ineffective against fires that were well established, and Freon generated highly toxic 
fumes upon exposure to a major conflagration. In small  concentrations, Freon had been 
shown to be very effective in the suppression of fires in oxygen-rich atmospheres if 
applied within a very few seconds of initial ignition, but this  did not seem to be feasible 
operationally for  the chamber and spacecraft configuration involved in these tests. 
addition, a Freon system for  the large chamber was estimated to be very expensive. 
A water-deluge system for  in-chamber use w a s  estimated to cost  less than any of the 
other systems considered, and the effectiveness of water deluge for  the types of fires 
likely to occur in the chamber was equal to o r  better than any of the other systems. The 
principal disadvantages of the water-deluge system were that its use would unquestion- 
ably resul t  in major damage to the spacecraft because the spacecraft contained many 
components and mater ia ls  that were highly susceptible to  water damage; also, a visibil- 
ity problem from cold fog (fig. 28) would exist to hamper rescue operations if the system 
were used during o r  immediately after a chamber repressurization, when the cryogen- 
ically cooled walls of the chamber were still cold. To assure  vacuum compatibility, the 
in-chamber piping for  the deluge system was maintained dry  and was vented continuously 
through the deluge nozzles to  the chamber volume. The piping was isolated from the 
external water supply by means of valves and vacuum-tight rupture disks. The rupture 
disks  were designed to  relieve and admit water to the chamber piping when the water- 
control valves opened and applied ful l  line pressure to  the disks.  To ensure that the 
in-chamber piping would not cool during testing to a temperature that would result  in 
water freezing in the line if flow were initiated, the piping was traced with thermostat- 
ically controlled electric-resistance heaters and was insulated thermally by a covering 
of sheet Teflon. 
I 
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Because of the consequences of spacecraft damage from water deluge in the event 
of inadvertent operation of the system, it was decided to include no automatic initiation 
devices. During nontest operational phases, control of the system was from stations 
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tems was transferred from the local stations 
at the manlocks to the test director console 
in the control room. During manlock 
operations, crewmen and manlock inside 
observers were always under direct  obser- 
vation through the viewports by outside 
personnel at the manlocks. Control of man- 
lock deluge systems under these circum- 
stances was maintained active at the test 
director console and at the local stations 
at the manlock. 
Safety 1 nstrumentation Package and 
C i rcu i t  Protection 
Because the tests were developmental, 
it was considered that special precautions 
to ensure crew safety were warranted over 
and above those taken on flight missions 
which involved fully developed and qualified 
hardware. One such precaution was the use 
of much more biomedical instrumentation 
to monitor physiological status than was used in flight. This extra instrumentation was 
feasible in the ground tests because the instrument signals could be brought out to dis-  
plays and recorders by means of hardline electrical  umbilical cables without regard to 
the restricted number of telemetry channels that were needed to obtain such data in 
flight. It was decided to measure partial  pressure of oxygen (0 ) and C02, sternal and 
axillary electrocardiogram (ECG), respiration rate,  deep body temperature, breathing- 
gas temperature, and total pressure.  Sensors for partial pressure of 0 and C02  were 
mounted inside the helmet area. Total gas pressure was sensed in the torso area. 
Breathing-gas temperature was sensed at the inlet to the suit. The impedance pneumo- 
graph (for sensing respiratory rate), the ECG sensors,  and the deep body-temperature 
sensor were mounted directly on the crewman. 
Figure 28. - Chamber fogging following 
a practice emergency repressuriza- 
tion and water deluge. 
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Signal conditioners for  the instruments and the associated wiring harnesses  were 
mounted on a vest-like supporting garment that was made of Teflon fabric; this vest was 
worn. over the undergarment (fig. 29). The three barostats, which triggered chamber 
emergency repressurization when a lower safe limit of total pressure was sensed, a lso 
were mounted near the signal conditioners. All signals were brought out by means of 
a connector that could be mated directly to the electrical  umbilical in the cabin or,  if 
the crewman was garbed in a pressure suit, the connector could be mated to  another 
hermetically sealed connector on the pressure garment and then to  the umbilical. This 
entire assembly was referred to as the safety instrumentation package (SIP). 
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Figure 29. - Safety instrumentation 
package . 
Figure 30. - Some of the GSE fluid lines 
in the CSM test installation. 
Protection against arcing o r  overheat- 
ing of the bioinstrumentation equipment in 
the oxygen-rich space-suit o r  cabin environ- 
ment was provided by fuses rated at 250 mil- 
liamperes in each conductor at the point of 
electrical penetration of the chamber. In 
addition, protection against inadvertent dan- 
gerous electrical  shock to the crewman 
through the ECG leads was provided by add- 
ing a 200-kilohm resistance in series with 
each lead. 
Ground Support Equipment 
FI uid Lines 
Nonflight piping and tubing was used 
extensively inside the chambers to provide 
for fluid flow between the spacecraft and the 
GSE that was outside the chamber (fig. 30). 
During the test, these lines were used for  a 
variety of purposes, including off-loading 
dummy propellants to simulate changes in 
thermal mass,  providing gaseous hydrogen 
f o r  fuel-cell operation, providing emergency 
means of detanking LO2, dumping crew 
liquid wastes, and sampling cabin atmos- 
pheres. Problems with these fluid lines 
were one of the most persistent threats to 
operational success during most of the test 
program. Problems were of two types. 
First, there were leaks in the lines, which 
usually occurred only under full thermal- 
vacuum conditions. Second, there were dif- 
ficulties in maintaining line temperatures 
at desired values, which resulted in lines 
being blocked by frozen fluids. 
In original test  installations, extensive 
use was made of mechanical connections in 
the fluid lines. In spite of the greatest care  
in installation and thorough leak checking 
(using best state-of -the-art helium leak- 
detection techniques), all of the ear ly  tests 
proceeded with marginal chamber vacuum 
because of the high gas loads imposed on 
the chamber pumping systems from leaks 
in these connections. Because of the rela- 
tively limited pumping capacity for  "noncon- 
densables" and because of the explosion 
37 
hazards associated with hydrogen in the chamber and pumping systems, leaks in the 
hydrogen supply line to  the spacecraft fue l  cel ls  were particularly troublesome. The 
use of improved washers  in the piping connections and attempts to encapsulate the con- 
nections in vacuum-compatible epoxy proved to  be inadequate for  high-vacuum service.  
For  the final t es t s  in the series, all mechanical piping connections were replaced with 
welded connections, which proved to  be adequate. 
The fluid lines were protected against freezing by electrical  resistance heaters.  
Problems were encountered because of frequent open-circuit failures,  poor heat trans- 
fer between the heaters  and the piping, and inadequate thermal  insulation of the piping- 
heater configuration. These problems were solved in later tes t  runs  by tracing the 
l ines with redundant heaters,  using a thermoset plastic for  the heater-to-piping bond in 
some instances, and wrapping each line with a double layer of aluminized Mylar reflec- 
tive insulation held in place by g lass  tape. These measures  greatly reduced, but did 
not completely eliminate, instances of fluid-line failure that w e r e  caused by low 
temperature. 
Attempts to sample cabin gases  through lines connected to  gas-analysis equipment 
outside the chamber were marginally successful. Again, the principal problem was in 
maintaining proper line temperatures.  If the temperature in even a small  segment of 
the sampling line was permitted to become less than the spacecraft cabin temperature,  
condensation of some sample fractions within the line was probable. Conversely, if  the 
line was  operated at too high a temperature,  the chemical structure of the gases  that 
were being sampled was likely to be altered. A sample-line temperature of approxi- 
mately 155" F was considered to be optimum; however, limited temperature measure- 
ments and other indirect evidence indicated that this was seldom achieved. In several  
instances, the sample lines were completely plugged by frozen water.  Cabin gases 
were collected through the l ines by two methods: by cryodeposition on LN2-cooled 
plates for  analysis at a much later date, and by collection in evacuated bottles fo r  anal- 
ys i s  in near  real  time (within approximately 20 minutes). Analyses of samples collec- 
ted by use of the two different techniques correlated well. 
FaciI i ty Environmental Control System 
Tests of the CSM did not require the use of a facility ECS because the crewmen 
entered and left the chamber a t  atmospheric pressure.  A facility ECS was required, 
however, for  tes t s  of the LM because ingress  and eg res s  operations were performed 
under hard-vacuum conditions and it was not feasible to  use flight equipment (such as 
the PLSS) to  maintain suit pressurization and habitable atmosphere. Closed-loop-type 
environmental control systems were provided f o r  chambers A and B as a par t  of the 
original facility design and were used in 1966 f o r  manned tests of space suits. In these 
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units, metabolized oxygen was replaced from a stored supply, and the resulting CO 
was  absorbed in barium hydroxide canis ters .  Because the process  loop operated a t  sub- 
atmospheric pressure and the units were,  of necessity, located outside the vacuum 
chambers, even very small  inleaks of atmospheric air over a significant period of time 
resulted in a gradual dilution of gas in the system to the point at which unacceptable 
nitrogen (N ) levels were present; there  was no way to purge the system of N2 during 
operation. Moreover, the systems had been designed, in general, to commercial  
2 
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standards, and the design included several  marginal fire hazards  and several  theoretical 
failure modes fo r  which no satisfactory redundancy o r  procedural alternate existed. An 
indepth review of the systems, conducted as a part  of the general  safety review of ground 
test operations in ear ly  1967, resulted in the systems being condemned and replaced 
with new open-loop systems that included detailed consideration of all of the rigid stand- 
ards that were developed at  that t ime. 
In the new system, which was used in tests of the LM, the flow of O2 to each of 
the two crewmen was regulated by the use of an individual control module (figs. 31 
and 32). A third module was  maintained in  operational status on standby and could be 
valved into the circuit  instantly in case of failure of e i ther  of the other modules (fig. 33). 
The pneumatic control system of these modules was designed to  permit precise  variable 
control of suit gas  pressure and flow ra te  over the full range of manlock and chamber 
operating pressures .  A major point of concern was the ability of the system to  main- 
tain suit p ressure  at o r  above the chamber or manlock pressure  during an emergency- 
repressurization event. If, f o r  any reason, the suited crewman was subjected to  an 
external pressure load (referred to  as negative pressure),  the general effect would be 
t o  collapse the suit and apply force  that would tend to move the crewman into the hard- 
helmet area of the assembly. At best, this  condition would be very uncomfortable for  
the crewman, and could cause cardiac a r r e s t  in extreme circumstances.  To preclude 
this possibility, a large check valve that was vented to the chamber atmosphere and 
that was  calibrated to  open at 0.02 psi  negative suit p ressure  was installed inside the 
chamber in each ECS supply line. This check valve would admit air to the suit loop 
and, thus, to  the pressure  garment automatically in adverse circumstances. 
Portable E C S  module r- - - - - - - - _ _ _  ------- 
I Emergency oxygen I 
Figure 31. - Simplified schematic of facility open-loop ECS module. 
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Figure 32. - Facility ECS module. 
In planning for  the hard-vacuum 
ingress-egress operation that was required 
for LM testing, the problem of adequate 
cooling of the crewman w a s  overshadowed 
by mechanical details associated with de- 
veloping an acceptable maneuver concept. 
Chilled-water-to-oxygen heat exchangers 
Figure 33. - Facility ECS flow 
distribution panel. 
were provided near the point at which the ECS supply lines penetrated the chamber 
walls in an attempt to regulate the temperature of gas entering the space suits. At the 
fu l l  rated flow of 15 f t  /min through the suit, the net effective cooling capacity for  the 
crewman was approximately 800 Btu/hr. Reliable estimates of crewman workload in- 
volved in the exercise were not available until the operational concept was well devel- 
oped and dry  runs using the actual EVA hardware had been performed. It turned out 
that, in original estimates, the work that was involved in manipulating the bulky umbil- 
icals  and climbing the access  stairs in the pressurized space sui t  had not been consid- 
ered fully. It was determined that sustained metabolic rates of approximately 1500 to 
2000 Btu/hr could be involved, and that short-time peaks could be 2500 Btu/hr. Analy- 
sis also disclosed that very little could be gained by lowering the suit-inlet-gas tempera- 
ture to  the medically permissible limit, which w a s  approximately 32" F. The addition 
of chilled-water supply and return lines to the umbilicals to service a water-cooled 
undergarment was considered to be undesirable because it would add bulk to the umbil- 
ical and would introduce additional complexities and failure points to  an already complex 
operation. In practice, this deficiency in cooling capacity was compensated f o r  (not 
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without considerable forbearance of the crewmen) by monitoring the metabolic load and 
body temperature of the crewmen closely and by pacing their  activity carefully during 
ingress  and eg res s  to avoid overheating. 
Mercury Contamination of the Environmental Control System 
During final preparation for LM testing, routine leak checks were made on the 
facility ECS distribution piping. This involved evacuating sections of the system and 
monitoring the evacuated volume with a sensitive leak detector while spraying suspect 
connections with helium. After one such operation, a technician was replacing the 
LN -cooled cold finger that was used in conjunction with the vacuum pump and called 
attention to a suspicious deposit that was determined to  be mercury. The ensuing in- 
vestigation disclosed no immediately apparent source of mercury contamination and 
brought to  light the absence of standard techniques to analyze and locate the trace mer-  
cury contamination in such systems. 
2 
I 
It was decided to open the ECS distribution system at convenient piping flanges, 
thereby dividing it into separate sections. This permitted checking for mercury in 
steps that would avoid spreading the contamination to other uncontaminated sections 
of the system. Three basic techniques for mercury detection were used. First, hot 
gaseous nitrogen was flowed through the isolated piping section, and the effluent was 
monitored by the use of an ultraviolet-absorption spectrometer. This  method was con- 
sidered to be the primary detection method; 
however, spot samples of the nitrogen ef- . -  fluent also were checked for mercury vapor .LDv .I" .._ 
by the use of selenium sulfide decoloration 
apparatus. If no t race of mercury was dis- 
covered, final assurance of noncontamina- 
tion was obtained by evacuating the line and 
sequentially heating all elements during the 
evacuation with a hand-held heat gun. An 
LN2-cooled t rap  (or cold finger) was in- 
stalled between the line to be evacuated and 
the vacuum pump. Afterward, the line was 
repressurized and the cold-finger surface 
was analyzed carefully for  traces of mer-  
cury. Using these techniques, it was de- 
termined that the mercury contamination 
was isolated in the piping section where it 
was discovered, and the source was deter-  
mined to be a valve that apparently had been 
contaminated at the vendor's before deliv- 
prohibitions against the use of mercury in 
the laboratory were strengthened, and 
standard procedures for  initial and peri- 
odic checks of environmental control sys- 
t ems  for mercury contamination were 
instituted. 
e r y  (fig. 34). A s  a resul t  of this incident, - e-- 
Figure 34. - Mercury recovered from 
the body and stem of contaminated 
facility ECS valve. 
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W or k-R e st C ycl es 
Several factors  combined to resul t  in  an extraordinarily high workload for  SESL 
personnel in late 1967 and throughout 1968. These factors  included late delivery of tes t  
spacecraft and the manifestation of a large number of late-identified problems in ready- 
ing the facility and spacecraft fo r  test. This  situation became apparent after it was too 
late to hire and train the supplementary personnel that were needed to maintain the re- 
quired schedule. As a result ,  large numbers of laboratory personnel were required to 
work extended hours of overtime. Work weeks with more than double normal  hours,  
sometimes for as long as 4 to 6 weeks consecutively without a single day off, were not 
unusual during nontest periods. As  the dates for  actual tes t  operations approached, 
those people who were  responsible for medical surveillance and laboratory management 
became concerned about the mounting evidence of fatigue among test-team personnel. 
To minimize the possibility of adverse incidents resulting from fatigue during the test ,  
rigid regulations regarding work-rest  cycles for  duty-station personnel during testing 
were formulated and enforced. It was required that all test-team members  be given 
at least one full 24-hour day off f rom any work duty immediately before the initial man- 
ning of a duty station. Most test-team members  were  permitted to  man stations on 
12-hour shifts, with a minimum of 12 hours between shifts; occasional exceptions were 
made, reducing the minimum time between shifts to 10 hours whenever test-essential 
activities demanded. Personnel manning duty stations that were particularly cr i t ical  
to crew safety were limited to 8-hour shifts. These personnel included the tes t  direc-  
tors ,  test conductors, medical monitors, and those people who operated the manlocks 
and environmental control system. Inside observers  were limited to  working 4 hours  
at altitude and 4 hours at  other tasks ,  for a maximum of 8 hours  per  shift. These lim- 
itations proved to be satisfactory in the aggregate, as there  was no noticeable degrada- 
tion of test-team performance over the long periods of test operations. One persistent 
problem was the chronic inflammation of the nasal passages of the inside observers  
when they were required to stay a t  altitude breathing pure, d ry  oxygen for  4 hours daily 
over a long period of t ime. This  problem resulted in an occasional temporary shortage 
of physically qualified inside observers  during some of the more extended test t ime. 
TEST RESULTS AND FLIGHT-SI GNI FICANT ANOMALIES 
Block I Command and Service Module Tests 
Operational summary. - There were three tests of the Block I CSM (spacecraft  008). 
The first was a 94-hour unmanned tes t  that began on July 26, 1966. This  test was aimed 
primarily at  demonstrating the operational capability of the combined spacecraft, facil- 
ity, and GSE installation before undertaking the manned test. The first manned test, 
of 183 hours duration, was started on August 2, 1966. This  test was designed to  demon- 
strate the adequacy of the Block I spacecraft for  manned Earth-orbital  missions; how- 
ever ,  anomalies during th i s  test resulted in a second manned test, which lasted for  
173 hours, beginning on October 26, 1966. The crewmembers  for  the first manned 
tes t  were volunteers f rom MSC; all were career  mili tary pilots on assignment to NASA. 
For the second manned test, two astronauts were joined by a military pilot. 
Unmanned test .  - Two major operational problems were encountered during the 
first unmanned test. The spacecraft  side hatch would not seal properly, apparently 
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because of the slow rate of pressure change in the chamber test  volume during initial 
pumpdown. After the abortive start and on all subsequent tests,  this problem was over- 
come by pressurizing the spacecraft cabin to between 0.5 to 1 .0  psid after hatch closure 
before chamber pumpdown. Later in the test ,  the spacecraft steam duct through which 
cabin air is vented became blocked with ice, and it was necessary to  thaw the duct by 
exposure to the side solar simulator and by raising the chamber pressure to permit 
convective heating. A procedural change in the operation of the ECS water boiler was 
implemented to avoid blocking the steam duct during subsequent operations. 
First manned test. - The "block simulation" type time line used for  CSM testing 
proved its value on the first manned test  (fig. 35) and on subsequent tests.  There were 
13 individual phases o r  "blocks, " and, during the test, it was necessary to change the 
sequence of these phases several  t imes to circumvent holds caused by problems in fa- 
cility o r  spacecraft equipment. The scheduled 19-hour pumpdown was doubled because 
of necessary repairs to the chamber emergency-repressurization system and to the gas 
chromatograph cabin-atmosphere sampling system. After pumpdown and cold-wall 
stabilization, the chamber pressure stabilized at 6.2 x to r r .  Several holds were 
experienced during the course of the test because of the e r ra t ic  performance of the 
chamber solar-simulator modules. These modules were being used for the first time 
in a major test, and, because it was a newly activated system, many real-t ime adjust- 
ments were necessary before the desired high reliability could be achieved. On Au- 
gust 4, a leak developed in a GSE helium line that supported proper operation of a 
quick-disconnect fitting in the line which supplies gaseous hydrogen to the fuel  cells. 
Warming the quick-disconnect fitting with side solar  simulators reduced the leak and 
eliminated the threat of a wet shutdown, which would have caused the fuel cells  to fail. 
After the first manned test, a concerted review of the test results w a s  undertaken. 
Some of the principal findings a re  given as follows. 
Regarding thermal response, the structural temperature did not respond as pre- 
dicted in all circumstances, partly because of difficulties with the thermal environment 
provided during the test. Difficulty in maintaining consistent solar-module operation 
and chamber-pressure increases because 
of leaks in vehicle ground support hardlines 
made it necessary to attempt verification 
of the Block I thermal model by using 
spacecraft- surf ace -temperature histories 
as a boundary condition rather than using 
data directly f rom the solar-simulator 
radiation intensity measurement system 
(RIMS). Also, it was determined that the 
CM heat leak was much higher than was 
predicted. This difference was believed 
to  be caused by an excessive amount of 
moisture in the CM superinsulation. 
Thermal data from the SPS test  
phases indicated a definite need for insula- 
ting and heating the propellant lines from 
the sump tanks to the engine interface and Figure 35. - Crew ingress for  first manned test. 
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for  modifying flight heater c i rcui ts  on other portions of the system. An unsatisfactory 
bonding technique for RCS quad heaters  was disclosed, which necessitated establishing 
an improved bonding technique. 
Evaluation of the ECS operation during testing disclosed that the suit-circuit evap- 
orator did not function. Also of concern was the difficulty in attaining a 100-percent- 
oxygen level in the cabin during ear ly  tes t  phases. It was thought that this  problem was 
caused by poor purging procedures during cabin closeout; it was necessary to  upgrade 
purge techniques to eliminate trapped nitrogen from the cabin interior before future 
pumpdowns o r  flights. 
During the test ,  water froze in the fuel-cell hydrogen purge line and at the hydro- 
gen vent. This problem required the addition of heaters  and the insulation of space- 
craf t  008 and flight vehicles to preclude freezing, which prevents required periodic 
purges of fuel cells and which could cause degraded fuel-cell powerplant operation. 
These anomalies, when considered together with many minor deficiencies, re- 
sulted in a decision to make corrections and to conduct a retest. Modifications included 
the replacement of two fuel cells in the SM, the installation of heaters  on the fuel-cell 
hydrogen vent line, the relocation of many instrumentation end-items, the rework of 
quad heaters,  and the rework of the ECS and CM side hatch. The environmental control 
unit and many of the cri t ical  environmental controls were replaced with updated equip- 
ment. A modification was made to the side crew hatch to incorporate a scientific air- 
lock that was scheduled for  use on la ter  Block I missions. Minor changes were made 
in other systems to  ensure that spacecraft 008 was  in the latest  spacecraft  012 configu- 
ration before the retest .  
Second manned test. - While the fuel cel ls  were powered up during final prepara-  
tions for the second manned test, they ceased to maintain an output load. Al l  three 
fuel cel ls  were shut down, and drying procedures were initiated. Only one fuel cel l  
could be recovered. A backup of water in the potable-water line, caused by an opera- 
tional e r r o r ,  resulted in flooding of the cells. A decision was made to revise the test 
for  operation with one fuel cel l  only, and closeout operations were continued. Crew 
insertion was accomplished as scheduled on October 25. However, during an ECS wick- 
wetting operation, a cr i t ical  total water flowmeter became inoperative. The ingress  
was terminated to replace the flowmeter. On October 26, the crewmen again ingressed 
the CM, and cabin purge and closeout procedures were completed. The following major 
objectives were established for  the retest. 
1. Demonstration of the Block I ECS performance in modes planned for  the 
CSM 012 mission using flight electrical power profiles 
2. Investigation of anomalies that occurred during the first thermal-vacuum test 
3 .  Demonstration of the effectiveness of the cabin and heat-shield purge proce- 
dures  for  minimizing cabin nitrogen content and heat-shield condensation 
4.  Demonstration of the Block I experimental airlock and canister mechanism 
operation in a thermal-vacuum environment 
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Chamber pumpdown was initiated on October 26 and was continued through Octo- 
ber 28. Pumping time was  longer than normal because of leaks in GSE lines. During 
pumpdown, performance of the ECS and suit integrity were demonstrated satisfactorily. 
At a chamber pressure  of 1 X 
tions proceeded with a top-solar hot-soak phase. 
to r r ,  with chamber cold walls stable at 90" K, opera- 
The 25-hour top-solar hot-soak test of the CM progressed without major incidents. 
Operation of the experiments airlock in  a hot environment was accomplished and data  
obtained on CM thermal  response that determined the effectiveness of the heat-shield- 
purge procedures adopted before the retest. Also, a successful fuel-cell hydrogen 
purge into the chamber environment was demonstrated. An attempt to accomplish a 
simulated urine dump through the spacecraft zero-g urine nozzle failed during this  
phase. Post-test analysis revealed that the urine nozzle had become blocked with c rys -  
tals of urine salts, which had formed in the urine lines after the first manned test. 
Later attempts to dump simulated urine failed and precluded attainment of test objec- 
tives in the zero-g urine-dump system. The top-solar hot-soak phase was completed 
on October 29, and a cold-soak phase w a s  initiated. 
The cold-soak period was accomplished successfully with the exception of an un- 
satisfactory demonstration of the experiments airlock operation. The airlock ablative 
plug failed to lock in place af ter  completion of airlock operations and fell back into the 
airlock cavity. Troubleshooting was  not attempted because additional problems might 
have ensued and forced ear ly  test  termination. The ability of the cabin emergency 
oxygen-supply system to  maintain a safe cabin pressure  after a 0.5-inch meteorite 
puncture in the cabin wall was  demonstrated successfully during this phase. Also, op- 
eration of the fuel-cell hydrogen vent line was demonstrated again and data were ob- 
tained that established satisfactory ECS performance and acceptable thermal  response 
of the cabin structure and insulation. The cold soak was terminated on October 30, and 
SM quad D hot-soak testing was begun. During the 10-hour quad D hot-soak test period, 
satisfactory operation of the quad thermal  control system was demonstrated. An inves- 
tigation of steam-duct operation by means of a simulated failure of duct heaters  a lso 
proved to  be successful; no freezing was observed at the duct outlet o r  inlet. 
Ear ly  on the evening of October 30, the only operational fuel cel l  failed as a re- 
sult  of a damaged hydrogen pump and was shut down; the test was continued on ground 
power alone. Shortly after the fuel-cell failure, an attempt to transfer potable water 
from the SM storage tank to the CM storage tank was unsuccessful. This imposed a 
severe time constraint on the test time line. Conservative estimates indicated only 
1.5 days of test time remaining because of crew water shortage. 
Side-solar hot-soak and radiator-mode testing was begun late on October 30 
(fig. 36). This test phase was used fo r  investigating transient and off-nominal modes 
of radiator operations, and several  off-nominal modes of ECS operation were tested to  
determine operational l imits that could be applied to mission rules.  On October 31, 
another attempt was made to t ransfer  potable water t o  the CM. This  attempt was suc- 
cessful,  and the water-shortage constraint was  removed from the test t ime line. In 
addition to the successful demonstration of a multitude of off -nominal radiator modes, 
successful operation of the ECS suit loop w a s  demonstrated, without problems, in a 
single lithium hydroxide canister mode. Late in the test phase, the ECS water/glycol 
pump circuit  breakers  were tripped, indicating abnormal operation. Manually resett ing 
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Figure 36. - Side-solar hot-soak and 
radiator-mode testing on space- 
craft  008. 
the circuit breakers restored normal opera- 
tion. This condition occurred periodically 
throughout the remainder of the test. After 
a demonstration of suit boiler operation with 
the water/glycol coolant loop deactivated, 
chamber repressurization was initiated on 
October 31. 
Warmup and repressurization t o  am- 
bient was completed on November 1. During 
descent, entry sequencing and barostat op- 
erations were demonstrated, and sui t  loop 
and cabin negative-pressure -relief opera- 
tion were verified. After a brief investiga- 
tion of the experiments-airlock ablative 
plug problem, which disclosed that the plug 
had been unlocked inadvertently during the 
airlock-securing procedure, the crew 
egressed the CM, and the vehicle was pow- 
ered down after post-test troubleshooting of 
test anomalies. 
The spacecraft 008 retest was success- 
f ul in lifting c er t if ic ati on - te st -re quire m ent 
constraints for the spacecraft 012 mission. However, as during the initial test series, 
operational problems with top and side solar simulation and leaks in GSE hardlines made 
analysis of thermal-response data difficult. The test  data did allow updating of the 
Block I thermal model for  improving the capability to predict mission thermal response, 
and showed improved performance by the CM heat-shield insulation. This improvement 
indicated the effectiveness of using dry-gas continuous purges of insulation areas during 
ground checkout. Even though data indicated improvement in heat-shield thermal r e -  
sponse, the CM heat leak was still higher than expected and was attributed to structural  
heat shorts  between the heat shield and the inner cabin structure. Considerable atten- 
tion was given to determining the effects of thermal-vacuum environments on the struc- 
tural  integrity of the heat shield. Although visible cracks were observed (fig. 37), the 
basic structural  integrity was maintained. The addition of heaters to the fuel-cell hy- 
drogen vent line was successful in preventing the freezing of water vapor at the vent 
exits. Rework of the quad D heater system proved to be beneficial in the restoration 
of predicted thermal response to the RCS quads. The problems experienced with the 
ECS sui t  water-boiler operation did not recur  on the retest  and, in general, the ECS 
performed nominally except for  minor problems that were, in most instances, peculiar 
to spacecraft 008. 
Throughout both manned tests of spacecraft 008, the spacecraft c rews  noted an 
excessive amount of condensation (fogging) of spacecraft view windows (fig. 38). It 
was thought that this condition was not a program problem at this point, and the prob- 
lem recurred in subsequent tests of the Block I1 spacecraft and in ear ly  Apollo flights. 
Off -nominal testing of subsystems modes and radiator configurations contributed 
to mission-rule and real-time evaluation c r i te r ia  for  use during subsequent Apollo 
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Figure 37. - Documentary photograph 
of c racks  in  the CM heat shield. 
Figure 38. - Command module window 
fogging. 
flights. Analysis of cabin atmosphere during all phases of the test  program resulted 
in the determination that no toxic products were outgassed by cabin materials; thus, 
this concern for  future manned flights was relieved. Satisfactory performance of the 
SPS thermal control was demonstrated during the retest, permitting improvements to 
be incorporated in future vehicles to ensure that propellant-feedline temperatures 
would remain above freezing during manned orbital missions. 
Block I I Command and Service Module Tests 
Operational summary. - Four tests were conducted on the Block II CSM (space- 
craft  2TV-1, fig. 39). The first was an unmanned vacuum test  of 29 hours duration 
that was begun on June 10, 1968. The primary test objectives were (1) the verification 
of the pressure integrity of the cabin and suit loop, (2) the oxygen compatibility of the 
powered spacecraft systems, and (3) the performance of the system provided for emer -  
gency dump of the onboard cryogenic oxygen. The second test  of 170 hours duration 
was a full thermal-vacuum teSt with an astronaut crew. The test  was begun on June 16, 
and there was a great  variety of test  objectives associated with certification-test r e  - 
quirements that had to be satisfied prior to the first manned Earth-orbital flight 
(Apollo 7) .  After this second test, the spacecraft was modified while still in the cham- 
ber  to a configuration matching that intended for lunar flights. Another unmanned test ,  
lasting 61 hours, was begun on August 24, 1968, under full thermal-vacuum conditions. 
In this test, a suit-loop stimuli generator was installed to satisfy calibration require- 
ments f o r  the environmental control systems. Other objectives dealt with verification 
of the adequacy of modifications made since the last test but before commitment to 
another manned test. On September 4, 1968, the last thermal-vacuum test of the series 
was started. Military pilots assigned to the NASA served as the crew for this 102-hour 
test. The numerous objectives were based on satisfying certification-test requirements 
that were restraining on the f i r s t  manned lunar mission. 
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First unmanned test. - The first un- 
manned test  was accomplished routinely 
except that, during the demonstration of the 
emergency LO2 dump system, the detanking 
took much longer than the design time. Be- 
cause this anomaly was subsequently shown 
to be significant relative to the failure in 
flight of the Apollo 13 LO2 tank, it will be 
discussed elsewhere in this report. Also, 
it is significant to  note that one of the main 
objectives of this vacuum test was to demon- 
strate the pressure integrity of the space- 
craft ,  its systems, and the GSE piping in 
the chamber before undertaking the major 
manned test. No leaks were evident during 
the test; yet, in the following manned 
thermal-vacuum test, the operation w a s  
jeopardized continuallv bv massive leaks 
Figure 39. - Spacecraft 2TV-1 being 
installed in chamber A. 
- -  
in hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen lines and connectors. Thus, it was shown that many 
fluid leaks a re  highly dependent on thermal conditions, and a vacuum test  alone at am- 
bient temperature does little to provide assurance of leak-tight performance in a fully 
simulated space environment. 
F i r s t  manned test. - Facility and vehicle turnaround activity in preparation for  
the first manned tes t  (fig. 40) began immediately after completion of the unmanned test  
phase. After fuel-cell powerplant activation and vehicle and facility closeouts, pump- 
down for the manned test phase began on June 16, 1968, and the thermal-vacuum tes t  
time line was started. After 15 hours of CM hot soak and 2 hours of cold soak, signif- 
icant nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen leak- 
age occurred in the facility supply systems 
to the spacecraft. In addition, several  
waterlines outside the chamber burst, 
shorting out a major section of the side 
solar  simulator. An alternate tes t  se- 
quence, including cabin depressurization 
and repressurization, was then accom- 
plished to make constructive use of the nec- 
essary  hold time. A s  a result  of the cabin 
pressure dump and the continued presence 
of hydrogen in the chamber, the facility 
gaseous-helium cryogenic pumping panels 
released their gas load, which drove the 
chamber pressure to a level of 5 x to r r .  
This pressure level was maintained for ap- 
proximately 15 hours because of the exceed- 
ingly heavy hydrogen and oxygen gas loads 
that were imposed on the chamber roughing- 
and diffusion-pump systems. Vacuum re -  
covery was achieved only after warming 
the vehicle with side solar simulators, Figure 40. - Crew ingress. 
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which effectively improved the cold-leak condition that caused high gas  loads. The 
chamber recovered nominal test conditions, and the test t ime line was  completed suc- 
cessfully after revision to make full use of remaining test t ime. All major objectives 
of the test were accomplished satisfactorily in spite of the difficulties. A review of the 
test data indicated that the anomalies were isolated to  the extent that they could be in- 
vestigated on a component o r  subsystem basis and would not require thermal-vacuum 
retest before the Apollo 7 mission. 
Configuration changes between tests. - After the first manned test ,  the spacecraft  
was modified to a configuration similar to that to  be used in ear ly  lunar-landing flights, 
and extensive rework of all communications hardlines and connections with the vehicle 
was accomplished in several  areas. The heavyweight, unified side hatch was replaced 
with the lightweight side hatch; the forward tunnel was modified to the CSM 103 configu- 
ration by the installation of a docking probe; the CM upper deck was modified to include 
the thrust  augmentation system; and the high-gain steerable-antenna system was in- 
stalled on the SM. Also during this  time, a specially designed hot-cold gas-shroud 
apparatus was  installed over and around the new lightweight hatch, and a series of 
thermal t e s t s  was conducted at ambient pressure to qualify the Block I1 side hatch for  
missions. The thermal  test revealed the necessity for  minor structural  modification. 
Retesting then verified satisfactory performance of the hatch configuration, and the 
shroud apparatus was removed. 
Second unmanned test. - Because of the fluid leaks that caused so much trouble on 
the previous test, it was decided to verify the revised configuration for  the next manned 
test by performing a thermal-vacuum unmanned test. During the test, several  fluid 
l ines leaked again in spite of improvements in their mechanical connectors, and the 
very thorough ambient-temperature pressure and leak checks that had been made in 
the interim. All other objectives, including a calibration of the ECS using a suit-loop 
stimuli generator, we re met successfully . 
Second manned test. - A major overhaul of the GSE fluid lines inside the chamber 
was accomplished before beginning the test. All mechanical connectors were replaced 
with welded connections. The flight-type disconnect fittings by which the oxygen and 
hydrogen f i l l  and vent lines were connected to the spacecraft were reworked to minimize 
the possibility of leakage. A s  a result, this w a s  the only test of the entire CSM series 
that w a s  not jeopardized sporadically by massive leaks in these lines. Chamber pump- 
down began on September 4, 1968, and operation during the thermal-vacuum test pro- 
ceeded in a nominal manner, except for  delays in start ing the SM hot-soak phase that 
was scheduled immediately after pumpdown completion. Real-time requirements to  
evaluate the flow character is t ics  of the urine nozzle in a cold environment caused a 
hold between pumpdown and initiation of side-solar operations. To  minimize impact 
to the overall  test time line, the cabin depressurization and open-hatch EVA operation 
(fig. 41) were accomplished concurrently with the zero-g urine -nozzle evaluations. 
The original test time line was begun again on September 6, and all test phases were 
completed successfully in a nominal manner. The chamber vacuum was maintained at 
a level of approximately 2.5 x t o r r  throughout the test, except when the vacuum 
was interrupted intentionally because of specific test objectives. 
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Test  resul ts  and anomalies. - The tests 
were satisfactory in achieving the integrated 
Figure 41. - Open-hatch operation. 
system and subsystem operating objectives; 
however, significant problems did develop 
in determining the thermal characterist ics 
of the integrated vehicle. Test resul ts  and 
anomalies for each major system are dis-  
cussed as follows. 
Thermal control systems: Success- 
ful  operation of the CSM integrated thermal 
control systems in extreme space environ- 
ments was verified during the tests. Deter- 
mination of thermal control systems thermal 
characterist ics was hampered by several  
anomalies: a warmer lunar plane than was 
planned (indicated temperatures between 
-80" and -150" F); infrared and reflected 
solar  flux and blockage of cold walls from 
chamber equipment; e r r o r s  in determining 
intensity of the solar simulation because of 
an inoperative RIMS heater system and er ra t ic  RIMS bar  movement instrumentation; 
and miscellaneous disturbances of the thermal environment that were caused by cryo- 
deposits, television lamps and floodlamps, and blistering of the CM thermal control 
coating and of the SM paint (fig. 42). The thermal-vacuum tests disclosed inadequate 
bay venting that required redesign of thermal blankets. Also as a result of the tests, 
passive-thermal-control attitudes were developed to prevent extreme temperature ex- 
cursions during flight. 
Figure 42.- Service module paint 
blistering. 
Crew equipment: The tes t s  demon- 
strated the design adequacy of crew equip- 
ment of the Apollo Block 11 spacecraft to 
accomplish Earth-orbital and lunar missions. 
However, the tests also identified the need 
for  redesign of the biomed cables and SIP 
because of failures, and the need for  mate- 
rial changes in the constant-wear garment 
because of skin and eye irritation experi- 
enced by the crewmen. A s  a result  of the 
2TV-1 crew recommendations, numerous 
other changes were made in such i tems as 
food packaging and storage, water chlorina- 
tion, and window-shade f i t .  
Environmental control system: In 
general, the test verified the operational 
capability of the Apollo Block 11 ECS under 
simulated-space-condition extremes with 
crewmen on board. However, the test in- 
dicated major problems in two areas: the 
radiator proportioning valve and the zero-g 
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urine -dump system. Sometimes the radiator proportioning valve had improper switch- 
overs that were caused by inadequate mixing of fluid upstream of the temperature sen- 
sor. Hardware changes were not implemented because this  was determined to  be a 
system character is t ic  and could be controlled in flight with a switch operation. The 
zero-g urine-dump system repeatedly froze during dumps because of latent heat re- 
quired for  vaporization, probably aggravated by water collecting in a low spot in the 
line under the one-g environment. This problem was resolved before flight by the addi- 
tion of a backup urine-dump outlet in the side hatch and a procedural change that pro- 
vided large manual dumps of the waste-water tank instead of small  automatic dumps. 
In addition to these major problems, two other significant problems were demonstrated 
that dictated redesign. Excessive water condensation was prevented on the CM flight 
configuration by increased insulation of cold lines. Tes t  resu l t s  a lso provided data on 
equipment response after loss  of coolant and provided an evaluation of frozen radiators,  
which resulted in development of flight procedures for  thawout and recovery of frozen 
radiators.  Window fogging during the test was erroneously assumed to be caused by 
moisture condensation between the panes. After s imilar  fogging occurred on the 
Apollo 7 and 8 flights, the windows on the test  spacecraft were dismantled, and the fog- 
ging was identified correctly as consisting of silicone outgassing products. A change 
in the mater ia l  and curing process  minimized this problem on subsequent flights, 
Communications: The operational integrity of communication systems under 
thermal-vacuum conditions was demonstrated; however, blackouts and background 
noise led to changes in ground network and vehicle communications network to prevent 
this  problem on flight vehicles. The test also demonstrated satisfactory SM high-gain- 
antenna operation at extreme conditions contrary to  qualification limits, and provided 
an evaluation of CM acoustic modifications under thermal-vacuum conditions. 
Service module reaction control system: The test verified the redesigned SM RCS 
secondary-heater operation and its capability to maintain engine components above min- 
imum redline temperatures in case of primary-heater failure. Several other factors  
were determined during the test: the temperature differential between the engine and 
the nozzle during the cold-soak and rolling phases; the temperature response of engine 
components to realist ic simulation of rolling mode (1 revolution/hr and 
2.5 revolutions/hr); and the SM RCS engine-component temperatures during a full solar  
hot soak. The test also provided verification that the engine package operational sensor  
gave a satisfactory reading for  the package temperature. One shortcoming of the tes t  
was  in the SM RCS area where Block I RCS tanks and components were used. The 
Block I RCS tank configuration was significantly different from the Block I1 configura- 
tion, and most of the test data in the SM RCS area could not be used to verify or im- 
prove the mathematical thermal models. The 2TV-1 test data were not considered to 
be adequate for  verification of Block I1 RCS, so a separate panel was run in a different 
facility fo r  this purpose. 
Command module reaction control system: The thermal response of the CM RCS 
to extreme space-environment conditions was determined as was  the heater-warmup 
response under varying initial conditions. 
Guidance and navigation: The test demonstrated the performance of the guidance 
and navigation system in combined systems operation in a simulated space environment, 
including systems operation in normal and backup modes, operation with secondary ECS 
glycol loop only, and operation during a simulated coolant-loop failure.  
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Stabilization and control system and entry monitor system: Operation of the sta- 
bilization and control system (SCS) and the entry monitor system (EMS) in the normal  
and backup modes was demonstrated. There were no major problems in the SCS; how- 
ever ,  the EMS failed to operate repeatedly in  V mode. This  failure prevented accurate 
null adjustment of the EMS, which affected the performance of subsequent EMS self- 
tests. Because this  was a prototype unit with a known weakness, no corrective action 
was required. 
Electrical  power system: Vehicle procedures for  one-fuel-cell operation were 
developed f rom test data; five- and eight-panel radiator performance was demonstrated 
satisfactorily over a wide range of loads and environments. 
Service propulsion system: The pr imary test  objective for  the SPS (that is, per- 
formance of the SPS thermal control heaters  under normal side-Sun conditions) was not 
met because of an unscheduled 19-hour cold soak and operation of the heaters  at lower- 
than-design power because of line losses  f rom the facility power supply. The unsched- 
uled cold soak caused a large decline in all spacecraft temperatures;  as a result ,  
internal spacecraft temperatures  did not approach normal values until near the end of 
the side-Sun operation. The secondary objective of obtaining thermal-response data  to  
use in the evaluation of SPS heater capability was met satisfactorily. Since then, analy- 
sis has  been indicative that the SPS heaters  are adequate for  all flight environments. 
Command module hatches: The test demonstrated the operational capability of 
the Block II CM lightweight unified crew hatch under extreme hot and cold space environ- 
ments. An evaluation was made of opening and operating procedures;  the hatch per-  
formed satisfactorily during simulated launch conditions, one cycle in a simulated space 
environment, and during postlanding simulation. After the first test, the forward hatch 
was replaced with a single pressure/ablative configuration and was successfully tested 
thermally but not functionally. 
Liquid oxygen dump system: The LO dump system, a nonflight innovation pro- 2 
vided specifically for  this test, was designed to t ransfer  the 640 pounds of LO in the 
SM flight tanks to a GSE tank suspended below the floor of chamber A in 3 minutes o r  
less. In an initial trial run at ambient chamber pressure using LN2 instead of LO2, 
this procedure required more than 30 minutes. An analysis of this operation, hampered 
by limited instrumentation, produced no conclusive reason for  this slow transfer. Dur- 
ing the first unmanned vacuum test, a demonstration LO detanking resulted in deple- 
tion of tank 2 in 11 minutes and depletion of tank 1 in 21 minutes. Again, analysis of the 
data  was inconclusive. Because the detank system was provided as a special  ground- 
based safety device, this  performance was  reviewed by the TRRB and was  judged satis- 
factory for  proceeding with the manned test. Further  analysis of the anomaly was  not 
undertaken. Subsequently, a slow LO2 detank on the Apollo 13 spacecraft at the launch 
site was  experienced. During the postflight investigation of the Apollo 1 3  inflight tank 
explosion, the slow detank of spacecraft 2TV-1 was reviewed again, and one of the tanks 
was sectioned for  examination. This examination disclosed that an adverse accumula- 
tion of manufacturing tolerances had occurred on the fill-line inverted-standpipe fitting 
in the tank, resulting in a leak path between the tank and the standpipe near  the top nf 
the tank. When pressarc -szs kpplitxi iinrough the tank vent line t o  force liquid up through 
2 
2 
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the fill-line standpipe, some of the pressurizing gas was leaked into the top of the stand- 
pipe, delaying the discharge of LO2. A s imilar  condition was postulated to have existed 
on the Apollo 13 tank, which contributed to the ser ies  of events leading to  the flight 
failure of that tank. This incident emphasizes the need to thoroughly investigate and 
completely explain all anomalies that occur during the test and that even remotely in- 
volve the spacecraft, whether they appear to be flight related or not. 
Lunar Module Tests Supporting Earth-Orbital Flight 
Operational summary. - Spacecraft LTA-8 (fig. 43) was delivered in late Septem- 
ber  1967. configured to support tests that were restraining on the first manned Earth- 
orbital flight (CM-3, Apolid 9). Two major late changes 6 production-run lunar 
modules had not been incorporated on LTA-8 because of cost and schedule considera- 
tions. These major late changes were a modification of propellant fluid-distribution- 
system fittings and a change in electrical-system minimum wire size from 22 to 18 gage. 
After delivery, trouble with fluid-distribution-system leaks and wire breaks compounded 
general problems that arose from first-time field use of operational checkout procedures, 
and delayed the start of the first test until April 1968. 
Five tests were conducted. The first was an unmanned test of 193 hours 32 min- 
utes duration, which began on April 1, 1968. The test was designed to be a thermal- 
vacuum shakedown of all GEE and the spacecraft. During the test, the conformal skin 
heaters were operated and exercised to  simulate various thermal conditions; the cabin 
was pressurized and depressurized; simulated propellant was detanked; and all other 
equipment that could be operated from outside the chamber was activated. Numerous 
deficiencies in the test setup were discovered, principally guard-heater failures o r  in- 
adequacies and leaks in the fluid lines. 
The second test was designed to man-rate the overall test setup. The test began 
on May 5, 1968, and continued for  84 hours 25 minutes, of which 13 hours were manned 
operation. Tes t  activity revolved around demonstrating successful activation of all 
spacecraft systems with a 100-percent-oxygen cabin atmosphere. Special precautions 
were observed during the first manned sys- 
tems  activation in that the chamber was 
pumped to 5.8 psia, and inside observers 
(wearing aviation breathing masks) with 
fire extinguishers were stationed directly 
outside the spacecraft hatch during the op- 
eration. Every circuit breaker, switch, 
and knob was exercised during this phase 
of the test to make sure  that no adverse 
effects would result. When this activity 
was completed successfully, the inside 
observers  removed the safety equipment 
f rom the chamber and located themselves 
in the chamber manlock while the cham- 
ber shroud was cooled to simulated space 
heat-sink temperatures, and the chamber 
was pumped to hard vacuum. Again, all 
Figure 43. - Spacecraft LTA-8 being 
installed in  chamber B. 
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circuit  breakers, switches, and knobs were actuated successfully, and the crewmen 
egressed the chamber after i t  was repressurized to 5 .8  psia. 
The cold-case thermal-vacuum test  was started on May 24, 1968, and continued 
for  288 hours. Two spacecraft mannings by the crewmen, lasting 10.5 and 12  hours, 
were conducted on May 27 and May 29, respectively. The first manning was  devoted 
to  cabin checkout and system operations, and the second manning was devoted to  simu- 
lated CSM/LM separation, LM maneuvering, and docking operations. As in all of the 
LM and CSM manned testing, each manning was preceded by at least 3 hours of pure 
oxygen prebreathing by the crew, to assure  denitrogenation (fig. 44). 
At the conclusion of the cold-case test, the condition of the spacecraft appeared 
to be excellent; therefore, it was decided to dispense with the scheduled 11-day turn- 
around between that test and the planned hot-case test. Instead of warming the chamber 
and repressurizing, the chamber was maintained cold and the pressure was raised to 
5.8 psia. Two crewmen replenished the spacecraft cabin consumables by entering the 
chambers in thermal-protective garments and aviation breathing masks with backpack 
oxygen supplies. The spacecraft was recycled thermally to initial test conditions by 
use of the conformal skin heaters, and the hot-case test was started on May 30, 1968. 
It had been estimated originally that approximately 3 days would be needed to warm the 
vehicle to the initial conditions for  starting the second test; however, by maintaining 
the chamber pressure at approximately 1 x 10 
tive heat transfer accelerated the spacecraft warmup so that initial conditions were es- 
tablished in approximately 12 hours. 
-2 to r r  instead of hard vacuum, convec- 
The hot-case test lasted 118 hours and featured two mannings with operations sim- 
ilar to those of the cold-case test. The first manning by the two crewmen lasted for  
9 hours on May 31 (fig. 45). As they egressed the spacecraft, a shear  pin on the 
Figure 44. - Crewmen prebreathing for 
manned LM test. 
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Figure 45. - Ingress  for  manned 
operations. 
spacecraft  side hatch was broken accidentally. The shear pin was repaired by two crew- 
men ear ly  in the second 14-hour manning on June 1, demonstrating the feasibility of 
making limited repa i rs  in hard-vacuum conditions. An additional feature -of this manning 
was the attempted activation of the PLSS in the LM cabin. This was not completed satis- 
factorily because of low PLSS battery voltage. 
Because of the importance of the PLSS-activation demonstration, a special 
21-hour test for  that purpose was started on June 5 with two crewmen. During the 
7 hours of manned operations, one crewman was attached to  the PLSS; then, he secured 
the spacecraft ECS and accomplished some general cabin activity while supported by 
the PLSS. All objectives were accomplished successfully. 
Tes t  resu l t s  and anomalies. - The results of these tests were considered to be 
satisfactory; 57 of the 62 certification-test requirements were satisfied outright, and 
the remaining requirements necessitated anomaly analysis for  subsequent disposition. 
In general, the vehicle structural  temperatures resulting from each test were well 
within allowable margins fo r  the Earth-orbital mission. The vehicle life support sys-  
tem also worked well, and the heat transport  system maintained equipment tempera- 
tu res  satisfactorily during all phases of operation. The significant anomalies that 
were encountered are as follows. 
1. A water-sublimator breakthrough was experienced when the secondary water/ 
glycol heat transport  system was activated by puncturing the isolation valve between it 
and the water management system. It had not been recognized previously that glycol 
contamination of the sublimator water in this  operational circumstance would be suffi- 
cient to  cause breakthrough. As a result ,  an accumulator w a s  added to all flight sec- 
ondary water/glycol systems, and procedures were revised to maintain isolation. 
2. The rendezvous r ada r  gave improper range displays. The problem was traced 
to a solder c rack  in the rendezvous-radar electronics assembly. 
3 .  No ground receiver backup was given when S-band signals were generated. 
The trouble was found to be in a diplexer, suspected to have been damaged by radio- 
frequency breakdown in the output isolator of the power amplifier. 
4. The abort  electronics assembly sustained memory loss  because of high tem- 
perature. This  loss  resulted from use of the wrong mounting bolts for  attaching the 
assembly to the cold rails. 
5. The water-quantity-measuring device failed because of a cracked solder fillet 
between a pad and a terminal that was swaged improperly to the printed circuit board. 
6. Pitch control of the S-band steerable antenna was lost  because of a broken 
wire in the pitch slew synchronization transmitter.  Excessive insulation had been 
stripped f rom the wire at its crimped connector, leaving it susceptible to damage. 
Lunar Module Tests Supporting Lunar Flight 
Operational summary. - There were several  configuration differences between 
the LTA-8 spacecraft used fo r  Earth-orbital flight-test support and the spacecraft 
55 
intended for use on lunar missions. The most significant change involved the venting 
scheme for the multilayer insulation that was used extensively through the spacecraft. 
The original scheme involved venting the spaces between the layers  to various internal 
spacecraft bays, thence through an opening into space. Later, more detailed analysis 
showed that the vacuum conductance of this  system was inadequate to lower the inter-  
layer pressure to a value that would result  in the necessary insulation efficiency fo r  the 
lunar mission. This  deficiency was confirmed during the f i r s t  Earth orbit  tests of 
spacecraft LTA-8, which was configured with the original insulation scheme. The de- 
sign of spacecraft to be used on lunar missions was revised to permit venting the insu- 
lation more directly to space. There were also significant changes to  the cooling loops 
of the ECS (called the atmospheric revitalization system on the LM). Three choices 
existed regarding site selection for  the modification of LTA-8 to incorporate the 
changes: (1) the spacecraft could be sent back to the factory, (2) the spacecraft could 
be removed from the chamber and modified at MSC, or (3) the spacecraft  could remain 
in the chamber and be modified in place. Studies showed a large economic and sched- 
ule advantage for  in-place modification because of the great number of cables and GSE 
fluid l ines that would not have to be removed and reinstalled. The in-place method was 
adopted, even though the limited working space in the chamber meant foregoing some 
of the details of the modifications. These configuration differences were taken into 
account analytically in the subsequent tests. Other configuration changes from the pre-  
vious test included upgrading the gas-sampling system, replacing the spacecraft  bat- 
te r ies  with less expensive thermal  simulators, deactivating several  unreliable 
spacecraft circuit breakers  that would have been too costly to  replace, and provisioning 
drinking water for  crewmember use in the spacecraft because of possible biological 
contamination of the normal spacecraft supply. 
Cold-case testing began on October 14, 1968. The 280-hour test mission simu- 
lated translunar flight, descent from lunar orbit, lunar landing, lunar stay, and ascent 
to  lunar orbit. There were two mannings. The first, on October 18, was by two crew- 
men and lasted 9 hours. The second manning was 13.75 hours in duration and occurred 
on October 25 with two crewmen. During the simulated lunar stay, it became necessary 
to apply additional heat to the interstage area to  avoid freezing of the interstage water- 
line (an unexpected event); however, there were no significant breakdowns of equipment, 
and time to  refurbish the setup for  the following hot-case tes t  was minimized. 
The countdown for  the hot-case test was started on November 4; however, a 
30-hour hold w a s  necessary to troubleshoot and repair  a problem in the facility commu- 
nications and biomedical instrumentation system. Stable initial test conditions were es- 
tablished on November 7, and the tes t  lasted 270 hours.  The test time line included 
simulation of translunar flight, descent f rom lunar orbit, lunar stay, and ascent to lunar 
orbit. These events were followed by a second descent from lunar orbit, a second 
lunar subsolar stay, and another ascent to  lunar orbit. The first and second mannings 
were on November 10 and 12, and lasted 14.75 and 13.75 hours, respectively. The 
third manning (fig. 46) on November 14 lasted 13  hours. The third manning involved 
operation of the ECS redundant loop during simulation of an ascent propulsion system 
burn to  depletion, followed by a 5.5-hour soakback, making the hottest possible cabin 
conditions. 
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Figure 46. - Crew ingress  through 
side hatch. 
Test  resul ts  and anomalies. - The suc- 
cessful conclusion of these tests marked the 
end of thermal-vacuum constraints to  the 
lunar-landing mission. Although no require- 
ment for integrated systems thermal-vacuum 
retest  resulted, a number of anomalies that 
occurred during the test required considera- 
ble additional investigation and, sometimes, 
confirmation of the correction at the compo- 
nent or subsystem level. Some of the most 
significant anomalies are listed as follows. 
1. During the hot-case mission s im- 
ulation, the descent-engine throttle -valve 
actuator failed after a 580-second firing of 
the descent engine. The failure was caused 
by a shorting of capacitors in the amplifiers; 
the short was caused by high-temperature 
conditions. 
2. During the cold-case simulation 
with the vehicle on the lunar terminator, 
the temperature of the waterline from as- 
cent water tank 1 reached 39" F and was still dropping. The simulated Sun was raised 
to  15" above the horizon to prevent freezing. 
3 .  The cabin-temperature-control valve failed to regulate properly because of 
degradation of an O-ring in the sensing element. 
4. The cabin indication was not observed when the data storage electronics as- 
sembly was in the voice-operated mode in the first test. The assembly did not operate 
during the following test series. 
5. The tracking light failed 25 minutes before it was scheduled to be turned off. 
The failure resulted from corona discharge from a potting void between a high voltage 
lead and the ground. 
6. The S-band steerable antenna did not respond to yaw commands. After the 
test, it was determined that the antenna had been caught in GSE wiring; however, even 
after the antenna was freed it was still sluggish. It was found that the socket leads from 
a power transistor in a servoamplifier were not soldered to the printed circuit  board. 
7. The quantity measurement on ascent water tank 1 indicated a decrease with 
no water usage. Post-test examination showed the correct amount of water in the tank; 
the gaging e r r o r  was caused by leakage of the nitrogen gas  that was used to pressurize 
the tank. 
8. The suit outlet pressure continued to  decrease beyond the normal backup pres-  
sure  after the cabin was depressurized. Leakage was determined to  be 30 percent over 
the specification limit of 0.0006 lb/min. Subsequently, the leak was located between 
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the heat exchanger and the water separators ;  however, the anomaly emphasized the dif- 
ficulty of quantitative leak checks on this  system under ambient (nonvacuum) conditions. 
10 
12 
5 
9. During simulated firing of the RCS jets, no fir ing indication was obtained. 
Investigation revealed a need to modify the positive positioning of the attitude -controller 
assembly during manufacturing. 
8 5 
12 2 
5 4 
10. The glass  cover over the display and keyboard in the cabin failed, resulting 
in a change to  the manufacturing glass specification for  flight spacecraft. 
Summary of Corrective Act ions 
Table I is a numerical summary of corrective actions taken because of anomalous 
performance disclosed by the tes ts .  Most of these changes were to the design of the 
spacecraft o r  to the operating procedures. The remainder,  approximately 18 percent 
of the total, were changes to the manufacturing processes  of the spacecraft components 
involved. Table I1 shows a numerical summary of specific performance investigations 
that contributed to  mission planning by providing a more accurate definition of actual 
performance l imits and constraints on systems operation. 
In evaluating the resul ts  of these ground tests, the presumed advantages of lower 
costs, greater safety, and better corrective actions were intuitively confirmed by engi- 
neering judgment. However, no post-test attempt w a s  made to  assess the cost-  
effectiveness of trade-offs between flight tests and ground tes ts .  
TABLE I. - NUMERICAL SUMMARY OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS RESULTING 
FROM DEFICIENCIES DETECTED DURING THERMAL-VACUUM TESTS 
Vehicle 
Block I CSM 
Block I1 CSM 
LM 
Subtotal 
Total 
Process  I Design I Procedure 1 
I 25 I 11 I 27 
63 I 
58 
TABLE 11. - NUMERICAL SUMMARY O F  CONTRIBUTIONS TO MISSION PLANNING 
FROM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION O F  THERMAL-VACUUM SPACECRAFT 
Thermal-vacuum 
tes t s  Vehicle 
Block I CSM 20 
Block 11 CSM 25 
LM 11 
Subtotal 56 
Ambient tes t s  
7 
9 
6 
22 
COMCLUD I NG REMARKS 
Total 
Manned testing of complete spacecraft in thermal-vacuum conditions was  con- 
ducted with a wide range of objectives. Primary objectives included man-rating the 
spacecraft, overall  demonstration of flight worthiness, investigation of performance 
in off-nominal and emergency modes of operation, determination of the effects of inter-  
action between subsystems in the integrated configuration, and verification and fine 
tuning of mathematical thermal  models. Among the secondary objectives were the ver i -  
fication of prelaunch ground checkout and flight crew operating procedures, and evalu- 
ation of crew-support i tems.  Special safety provisions for  tes t  personnel were designed 
into the tes ts .  When necessary,  calculations o r  simulations o r  special  test conditions 
were used where some unusually hazardous materials were concerned. 
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Overall  management of the test program was exercised by the Apollo Spacecraft 
Program Office, with detailed and operational authority delegated to the test organiza- 
tion; this  arrangement worked well. Major emphasis was placed on training the test- 
team members .  Special reviews were held to assure  safety of operations, and the 
readiness of facilities, spacecraft, and personnel to enter  into test phases. Special 
attention was  given to protection against f i res  and related hazards.  
Tes t  resu l t s  for  nominal subsystem operation showed spacecraft thermal  deficien- 
cies, p ressure  venting deficiencies, and subsystem performance problems that required 
design o r  procedural changes. Additional results f rom off -nominal subsystem opera- 
tions provided data  fo r  later use in mission rules  and real-time performance evaluation. 
Overall, the test resu l t s  provided verification that the spacecraft  would be accept- 
able f o r  manned space flight after necessary design and procedural changes were made. 
In evaluating the resu l t s  of these ground tests, the presumed advantages of lower costs ,  
g rea te r  safety, and better corrective actions were intuitively confirmed by engineering 
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judgment. However, no post-test attempt was made to assess the cost-effectiveness 
trade-offs between flight tests and ground tests. A summary report  of the resu l t s  of 
all facets of the tests would have been of value to highlight the performance, problems, 
and problem resolutions of this  test program. 
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